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These findings emerge from an examination of how 
the media have covered immigration going back to 
1980 with a special focus on the extended policy 
debates in 2006 and 2007, which collapsed without 
producing any significant legislation. Supporters of 
radically different positions in those debates agree 
that the current immigration system is broken; one 
need not favor any particular outcome to conclude 
that stalemate is a mark of failure in the policy 
process. Many actors in Washington and beyond 
played a role in that outcome, and the intent here is 
not to argue that the media were the decisive players 
or to rank their influence relative to others. The 
objective is to understand how the media condi-
tioned public opinion and the policy landscape, and 
the results show that the media—both traditional 
journalism and new forms of expression—need to 
be considered among the factors that contribute to 
polarization and distrust.
 While the immigrant population has grown vastly 
larger over the years, the terms of the policy debate 
over immigration have hardly changed in 30 years. 
Improving border controls; halting the employment 
of unauthorized migrants; dealing with temporary 
workers; determining legalization plans for people 
in the country illegally; refiguring visa categories 
for legal immigrants—all these topics have been 
debated repeatedly since at least 1980, and some 
have actually been legislated. In the meantime, 
however, the media have undergone a radical 
transformation marked by declining audiences 
for the daily newspapers and broadcast network 
evening news programs that once dominated the 
information flow and by rising new forms of 
news delivery via cable television, talk radio and 
the Internet. 
Immigration is a sufficiently important topic to 
justify attention on its own, but it also serves as an 
illuminating case study of how the transformation 
of the media has made the search for compromise 
on public policy issues more difficult in Washington. 
Fragmentation of the industry has generated 
The U.S. media have hindered effective policy making on immigration for decades, and their impact 
has been increasing in recent years as a result of an ongoing evolution in the media industry. Deeply 
ingrained practices in American journalism have produced a narrative that conditions the public 
to associate immigration with illegality, crisis, controversy and government failure. Meanwhile, 
new voices of advocacy on the media landscape have succeeded in mobilizing segments of the 
public in opposition to policy initiatives, sometimes by exaggerating the narrative of immigration 
told by traditional news organizations. The combined effect is to promote stalemate on an issue 
that is inherently difficult to resolve and that is likely to resurface on the public agenda when a new 
administration and a new Congress take office in January 2009.
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enhanced and more complex competition for 
audience shares. In response, all forms of news 
media have become more prone to jump on subjects 
and produce surges of coverage that convey an air 
of crisis. When the subject is institutional decision 
making in Washington, such surges can heighten 
public anxieties and impede the development of 
consensus on disputed issues by focusing on 
political process and gamesmanship rather than 
the substance of the issues. 
In the recent immigration debates of 2006 and 
2007, the new media landscape also amplified 
discrete sectors of public opinion to help block 
legislative action. In the first act of this drama, the 
Spanish-language media helped mobilize huge 
crowds to protest legislation passed by the House 
that would have mandated an unprecedented 
crackdown on unauthorized migrants including 
their jailing on felony charges. The protest marches 
of spring 2006 were one factor that pushed a 
bipartisan group of senators to present a counter-
proposal whose passage kept the other legislation 
from moving forward.
The new media voices played an even more 
significant role in the second act of the legislative 
drama. In 2007, conservative voices on cable 
television news shows, talk radio and the Internet 
mobilized opposition to provisions of a Senate 
bill that would have offered legal status, or 
“amnesty” as it was labeled, to unauthorized 
migrants. Meanwhile, liberal commentators and 
bloggers paid relatively little attention to the 
issue. Conservatives in the media successfully 
defined the terms of the debate in a way that 
helped lead to the eventual collapse of efforts 
to reach a compromise.
Both cases represented a triumph of “no!” These 
media sectors proved adept at promoting opposi-
tion to specific measures, but they have shown no 
comparable ability to advance an affirmative 
agenda. The media have given voice to strongly 
felt and well-defined views at either end of the 
policy spectrum. Meanwhile, the broad middle in 
American public opinion favors a mix of policy 
options on immigration, but that segment’s views 
are marked by uncertainty and anxiety about the 
topic and skepticism about government’s ability 
to handle it. This reflects the way the immigration 
narrative has been framed by the media for a 
generation. 
An important but unresolved question is whether 
these same dynamics apply to other issues that 
share certain characteristics with immigration. 
Comprehensive reform of health care and energy 
policies, like immigration, require the mediation 
of many competing economic and regional 
interests while also assuaging strongly felt ideo-
logical differences. If the effects of media transfor-
mation can be generalized, the recent failures to 
reach grand bargains on immigration should serve 
as a cautionary tale. 
The conclusions presented here are the author’s 
alone, but I draw them from the work of several 
institutions:
n	 	The Project for Excellence in Journalism 
(PEJ) produced a highly detailed examination 
of how the media covered immigration in 
2007 based on data collected for its News 
Coverage Index, which is the largest ongoing 
effort ever to measure and analyze the American 
news media on a continuing basis. PEJ’s 
report, “News Coverage of Immigration 2007: 
A Political Story, Not an Issue, Covered 
Episodically,” by Banu Akdenizli is based on 
analysis of 70,737 stories from 48 media outlets 
in five media sectors.
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n	 	At the Brookings Institution, E.J. Dionne Jr. 
conducted an extensive analysis of public 
opinion survey data drawn from multiple 
sources to track the development of attitudes 
toward immigration and the media’s role in 
shaping them. His report, “Migrating Atti-
tudes, Shifting Opinions: The Role of Public 
Opinion in the Immigration Debate,” examines 
historical trends in segments of the public 
based on partisanship, ideology and other 
characteristics and uses new data to probe 
deeply into the impact of specific media sectors 
on public opinion during the most recent 
debate.
n	 	An analysis of the media’s handling of immi-
gration from 1980 to 2007 was conducted at 
the Annenberg School for Communication at 
the University of Southern California under 
this author’s direction. Large bodies of 
coverage from national and regional newspa-
pers, the Associated Press, the broadcast 
television networks and National Public Radio 
were assessed for the volume of coverage, the 
topics covered and the major attributes of the 
coverage. In addition, the coverage of several 
major news stories was examined in greater 
detail. Coverage of the 2007 immigration 
debate on five major blogs was also analyzed.
The PEJ and Brookings Institution reports are 
published in their entirety accompanying the 
printed version of this report and are available 
along with other related materials at www.
brookings.edu.
Although the media have undergone an accelerat-
ing transformation during the period examined 
here, there is a great deal of continuity in the 
approach to immigration. Changes in the media 
landscape have exaggerated some long-standing 
tendencies in the coverage and in some cases have 
taken them to extremes, but the changes have not 
produced stark turns in new directions. As new 
“advocacy journalists”—the term CNN’s Lou 
Dobbs uses to describe himself—have come on the 
scene, they have framed immigration stories in 
much the same way as traditional news organiza-
tions even while departing from long-established 
journalistic norms. 
While individual stories about immigration may 
have been entirely accurate, the cumulative effect 
of U.S. media coverage has distorted the underly-
ing realities of immigration while conditioning 
audiences in ways that make it more difficult to 
forge policy compromises. Three major tendencies 
characterize the way immigration has been 
covered by the U.S. media:
1.  The legendary newspaper editor Eugene 
Roberts of the Philadelphia Inquirer and The 
New York Times drew a distinction between 
stories that “break” and those that “ooze.” 
Immigration is a classic example of a news 
story that oozes. It develops gradually, and its 
full impact can be measured only over long 
periods of time. In contrast, coverage of 
immigration has been episodic, producing 
spikes of coverage and then periods when 
attention falls off. The spikes have been driven 
by dramatic set-piece events such as the Elian 
Gonzalez saga, congressional debates and 
protest marches. The surges in coverage have 
conditioned the public and policymakers to 
think of immigration as a sudden event, often 
tinged with the air of crisis. The biggest of all 
the surges came with the congressional debates 
of 2006 and 2007.
2.  Illegal immigrants have never constituted more 
than a third of the foreign-born population in 
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the United States, and that mark has been 
reached only in recent years. Nonetheless, 
illegal immigration and government’s efforts to 
control it have dominated the news coverage in 
all sectors of the media by wide margins for 
many years. This pattern of coverage would 
logically cause the public and policymakers to 
associate the influx of the foreign born with 
violations of the law, disruption of social 
norms and government failures. 
3.  Immigrants, in particular, but also policymakers 
and advocates, have dominated the journalistic 
narratives to the exclusion of other critical 
actors, especially employers and consumers.  
At the simplest level, this has deprived the 
coverage of essential context by underempha-
sizing the role of the U.S. labor market in 
determining the size and characteristics of 
immigrant flows and overemphasizing the role 
of government. When their attitudes toward 
immigration turn negative, audiences exposed 
to this kind of coverage can readily view 
immigrants as villains and themselves as 
victims. Distrust of government—a seeming 
accomplice or an incompetent protector—is a 
natural byproduct. 
When immigration is associated with crime, crisis 
or controversy, it makes news. Immigrants and 
political actors are the primary protagonists of these 
dramas, while the public is a passive bystander. 
And as the transformation of the media has taken 
hold, this pattern has been repeated over and over 
again for many years with increasing intensity. The 
breathless, on-and-off coverage—more opera than 
ooze—has mischaracterized a massive demographic 
event that has developed over decades and mostly 
through legal channels. And at the same time, it 
has helped create contours in public opinion that 
have rendered the enactment of new immigration 
policies ever more elusive. 
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Speaking in the grand formality of the East Room 
with members of his Cabinet assembled before 
him, Bush had delivered one of the most expansive 
and detailed presidential statements on immigration 
in U.S. history. He spoke compassionately about 
“the millions of hardworking men and women 
condemned to fear and insecurity in a massive, 
undocumented economy.” The nation “depends on 
immigration” to fill its labor force, Bush said, and 
yet “the system is not working.” He offered a set of 
broad principles and several detailed proposals 
and asked Congress to start debate on a sweeping 
reform of the immigration system.
Like most of the other news accounts of the speech, 
ABC focused on just the most controversial 
element of the president’s plan: his proposal for a 
temporary worker program. The coverage largely 
failed to note that Bush had proposed a fundamen-
tal redirection of immigration policy to emphasize 
the needs of the U.S. labor market. And, then, 
suddenly, the subject of immigration, so historical, 
so momentous, for one day, was gone. 
The big newspapers wrote some reaction stories 
and then declared the Bush proposals politically 
dead. The entire subject virtually disappeared from 
ABC’s premier news broadcast for the rest of the 
year. From that night, January 7, until the end of 
2004, “World News Tonight” never did another 
story on immigration policy. In fact, immigration 
was the central focus of only three stories over 
those 12 months, two about faltering efforts to 
control the illegal flow along the border with 
Mexico and the other about illegal migrants 
drowning in the Caribbean. Otherwise, the topic 
came up only peripherally in stories about subjects 
like anti-terrorism policy or a Cabinet nominee 
with an illegal nanny problem. 
ABC’s performance exemplifies the way major 
news organizations have approached immigration 
for the past 30 years. If immigration is associated 
with controversy or crisis, it makes headlines. The 
rest of the time, it gets token attention. And, in this 
pattern that fluctuates between flashy and meager 
attention, the reporting has often taken a narrow 
focus, emphasizing illegal behavior and political 
conflict. The breathless, on-and-off coverage has 
mischaracterized a massive demographic event 
that has developed over decades and mostly through 
legal channels. This mischaracterization is evident 
On the evening of January 7, 2004, AbC’s “World News Tonight With Peter Jennings” opened its 
broadcast with a report that President bush had announced a new immigration reform proposal during 
a White house speech that day. It was a remarkable, even historic speech, and Jennings framed 
it as such, saying, “We’re going to begin tonight with an issue that has invigorated and troubled 
the United States since the very beginning: Who has the right to be here?” Later, Jennings invoked 
Thomas Jefferson and other Founding Fathers to emphasize the weightiness of that day’s news. 
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both in the long narrative arc of news coverage 
of mounting immigration and recently when 
Washington tried but failed to come to grips with it. 
One element of Bush’s January 2004 speech drew 
near-unanimous agreement from the public and 
from policymakers in both parties: his conclusion 
that the immigration system is broken. Under 
pressure from across the political spectrum, 
Congress took up the subject of immigration in 
late 2005, in a debate that lasted some 18 months, 
through the summer of 2007. Bills passed in both 
houses, but ultimately no comprehensive legisla-
tion was enacted. In the 2008 campaign, both 
presidential nominees have promised to resume 
the effort, but the winner in November will have 
to start from scratch. Despite a great deal of effort, 
none of the major issues involving immigration is 
any closer to being resolved than on the day Bush 
spoke in the East Room in January 2004. If anything, 
the more the issues have been debated, the more 
polarized the positions about them have become. 
This paper examines the media’s role in the evolution 
of the current stalemate over immigration policy. 
Many actors in Washington and beyond have 
contributed to that outcome, and the intent here is 
not to argue that the media were the decisive player 
or to rank their influence relative to other players. 
The objective is to understand how the news media 
conditioned public opinion and the policy landscape 
and to assess whether the news coverage of 
immigration helped or hindered the development 
of policy. Making that assessment does not require 
taking a position on what kind of policy would be 
desirable. On immigration, as with any number 
of other major public policy issues, advocates for 
radically different policies agree that stalemate is 
itself a sign of failure. Unless the upcoming 
elections dramatically change the partisan balance 
in Washington, finding a way to break the stalemate 
will be the first order of business when work 
resumes on immigration.
The research presented here shows that the media 
played a very direct role in heightening the 
polarization on immigration issues during the 
most recent round of policy debate. To the extent 
that successfully adopting new policies of any kind 
would have required a compromise solution, the 
media contributed to the failure of the policy 
process in 2006 and 2007. Some of the most recent 
developments in the media industry came into play 
as this congressional debate unfolded, but long-
standing trends in American journalism also 
contributed to the outcome. To capture both factors, 
this paper examines coverage of the recent debate 
in considerable detail and also looks back over a 
quarter-century of journalism about immigration.
The current wave of immigration has developed 
slowly and steadily since the 1970s, a period in 
which American journalism has undergone a 
profound transformation. Sources of information 
have multiplied. Demand for headline-making 
dramas and easily defined controversies have 
increased exponentially. New kinds of media have 
become articulators and amplifiers of conflicting 
opinion. The way immigration is covered, however, 
shows considerable continuity. Even as they 
produced a journalism of strident advocacy, the 
relative newcomers of cable television and the 
blogosphere have shown the same basic tendencies 
that were evident decades ago in broadcast 
television and newspapers. The overall effect has 
been to heighten contradictions in public opinion 
…the media played a very direct role in heightening  
the polarization on immigration issues during the 
most recent round of policy debate.
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rather than to help resolve them. Over the course 
of many years, traditional journalism presented a 
distorted portrayal of immigration; when the new 
forms of media supercharged that portrayal, the search 
for policy compromises became more difficult. 
NEw IMMIgRaNTS, NEw MEDIa
In the mythology of America, this country has 
always been a nation of immigrants. But history 
tells a different story, one of migration that has ebbed 
and flowed in distinct phases. The iconic era of 
Ellis Island migration ended in the early 20th 
century because of the effects of two world wars, 
the Great Depression and federal policies designed 
to keep out nationalities judged undesirable. Thus 
by the 1960s, the Irish and the Italians, the Poles 
and the Scandinavians and all the others who had 
come to America during the great trans-Atlantic 
wave were dying off, and no great numbers of 
newcomers had been coming from anywhere else 
to replace them. The golden door had stood closed 
for two generations. The U.S. census of 1970 reported 
a foreign-born population of 9.6 million, the 
lowest mark of the 20th century. By an even more 
important measure, the United States was less a 
nation of immigrants in 1970 than it had been at 
any time in its history. The share of the foreign 
born in the total population dipped to 4.7 percent, 
the lowest point ever recorded. 
But at that very moment, new flows of immigrants 
from Latin America and Asia were developing and 
gaining momentum. By 1980 the number of 
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foreign born had shot to 14 million as a new era of 
immigration got under way. Then, over the next 25 
years, the U.S. experienced the most intense influx 
of immigrants in its history, bringing the total to 
nearly 36 million in 2005. As of this writing, estimates 
put the U.S. foreign-born population at 39 million. 
That is close to 13 percent of the population, a share 
approaching the highest levels recorded a century 
ago. The United States is once again very much a 
nation of immigrants, and the current influx 
appears to have gained momentum and staying 
power. According to Census Bureau projections, 
migration will add more than a million people a 
year to the population for many years to come.
By any standard this has been a massive historical 
event, one that has been relatively continuous for 
a quarter-century, wide-reaching, transformative 
and challenging. As a demographic change, it 
ranks in magnitude with the black migration out 
of the South, the birth of the baby boom generation, 
the white migration to the suburbs and the rise 
of the Sunbelt. But, unlike internal migration or 
birthrates, the arrival of people from overseas is 
explicitly a matter of federal policy. No one is 
supposed to come into the country without 
permission, and there is a complex system of visa 
categories to determine how many people and 
what types of people are granted permission to visit 
or reside here. Nonetheless, the current era of 
migration is not the result of explicit policy decisions. 
The idea of quadrupling the foreign-born population 
was never debated in presidential campaigns or on 
Capitol Hill. No one voted for it—not the electorate, 
not Congress. And, until the past couple of years, 
the enormous fact of the demographic change 
under way for a quarter-century had drawn a 
disproportionately small share of attention from 
academic researchers, think tank experts and 
pundits who often inform policy debates. Further-
more, and despite the efforts of a few devotees to 
promote the “integration agenda,” the questions of 
what happens to immigrants once they get here—
What is their place in American society? Is society 
responsible for promoting positive outcomes?—
remain fairly obscure topics in policy circles. This 
was not inevitable. During the trans-Atlantic era, 
there was almost constant debate and policymaking 
over immigrant flows, their size and their compo-
sition, as well as the immigrants’ social status and 
the extent to which they were integrating into 
American society.
Explaining the many social, economic and 
demographic factors both here and abroad that 
produced the current wave of immigration is 
beyond the scope of this paper. For our purposes 
it suffices to note, first, that as a matter of constitu-
tional doctrine since the 1870s immigration is 
supposed to be regulated by the federal government. 
And, second, that during the current era of 
migration the federal government has manifestly 
failed to carry out that responsibility. The presence 
of more than 12 million unauthorized migrants is 
prima facie evidence of policymaking that has been 
haphazard, episodic and ultimately ineffective. If 
more evidence is needed, one can search across the 
entire spectrum of political opinion without finding 
any major figures who argue that the immigration 
system as it stands is a success and should be left 
unchanged. Demands for change come from those 
who believe the current system is too generous 
and those who think it’s not generous enough; 
from those who see immigrants as an economic 
The presence of more than 12 million  
unauthorized migrants is prima facie evidence  
of policymaking that has been haphazard,  
episodic and ultimately ineffective.
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boon and those who see them as a burden; from 
those who worry about too much cultural change 
and those who extol it. Despite this near-unanimous 
verdict on the status quo, Washington was unable 
to enact a new immigration framework in 2006 and 
2007; instead, the long, contentious congressional 
debate ended in deadlock. One need not favor 
any side of the issue to conclude that inaction 
constitutes failure. 
The current era of migration has coincided with 
the sweeping transformation of the American 
news media. The trends are stark and accelerating. 
According to the Project for Excellence in Journalism, 
the network evening news broadcasts have lost 
roughly one million viewers a year for the past 25 
years, circulation for Sunday newspapers dropped 
11.4 percent between 2001 and 2007, and meanwhile 
37 percent of Americans now regularly get some 
news on the Internet and the audience for cable news 
prime time talk shows jumped by 7 percent in 2007 
alone.1 This paper explores how the failure of 
policymaking on immigration is related to the 
changes in the way Americans get their news. In 
particular our intent is to understand the news media’s 
role in helping to engender the current policy 
environment, which is marked by acute polarization 
and stalemate amid widespread dissatisfaction with 
the existing system. As abundantly demonstrated 
in the congressional debates of 2006 and 2007, this 
environment is very poorly suited to developing policy. 
POlITICal fRagMENTaTION  
aND gRaND baRgaINS
Throughout the current era, immigration has 
generated its own peculiar political dynamics. 
Both major political parties are internally divided. 
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There is also fragmentation among labor unions, 
business associations, and even ethnic and civil 
rights groups. This is not primarily a matter of 
two sides holding starkly differing views, pro and 
con, regarding basic principles (although there is 
some of that). Instead, much of the fractiousness 
involves advocates with narrow agendas: growers 
seeking seasonal farmworkers; high-tech firms 
seeking engineers; libertarians opposed to national 
identity documents; proponents of rigorous 
enforcement measures; Asian groups preoccupied 
with family visas, Latino groups preoccupied 
with legalization for the undocumented, others 
preoccupied with refugees and particular  
nationalities; unions wanting to grow by organizing 
immigrants and unions wanting to protect their 
existing members from competition with  
immigrants. And there are many other sides  
to the prism.
Given this kind of political fragmentation, 
immigration is quintessentially the kind of issue 
that requires a nonpartisan, multiplayer compro-
mise to produce successfully new policy in 
Washington. As such, understanding the media’s role 
in the development of immigration policy—or the 
failure to develop policy—can have applications to 
other issues. The transformation of the media is 
still very much under way, but it is hardly too early 
to begin asking how it affects the nation’s ability to 
resolve its most intractable problems.
Immigration is a particularly instructive case study 
because there has been a round of major policy 
debates in the middle of each decade since the 
1980s, while the basic policy tools have changed 
very little. Border control and worksite enforcement 
have been constant themes, along with the 
manipulation of visa categories to control future 
flows. Legalization programs for the current 
population of undocumented migrants have also 
been considered repeatedly, as have temporary 
worker programs. And, for the most part, the 
political objective has also remained the same: 
forge an ad hoc coalition in which participants are 
all required to sacrifice something to get most of 
what they want. In each of the three rounds 
Washington tried to produce a grand bargain.
The first round of policymaking took place in the 
1980s, when journalism was still dominated by 
traditional news organizations. Of the three rounds, 
that was the only attempt at a grand bargain to 
achieve substantial success. By the time immigration 
was debated again, in the mid-1990s, cable 
television had emerged as a powerful influence 
on journalism with the creation of the 24-hour 
news cycle. That attempt met with less success at 
reaching a compromise. During the most recent 
round, in 2006 and 2007, the Internet, partisan 
talk radio and politicized news programming on 
cable television were major factors. That attempt 
to forge immigration policy ended, as noted 
earlier, in stalemate. Over the course of this 
quarter-century, then, the scale of the policy 
challenge has grown exponentially, and the scale 
of actual policymaking has diminished.
This paper examines the media’s contribution to 
that outcome. Our intent is to understand how 
immigration and immigration policy have been 
depicted by the American news media from 1980 
to 2007 and how that coverage relates to public 
Immigration is a particularly instructive case  
study because there has been a round of major  
policy debates in the middle of each decade since 
the 1980s, while the basic policy tools have  
changed very little.
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opinion and policymaking during most of the 
current era of immigration. The research involved 
several forms of content analyses of more than 
80,000 news stories or commentaries from print, 
broadcast and digital media as well as an examination 
of dozens of public opinion surveys.
IMPEDINg COMPROMISE 
Our analysis concludes that the dominant approaches 
toward coverage of immigration have interacted 
with changes in the structure of the news media in 
a way that has promoted ineffectual policymaking. 
Thus, elements of both continuity and transformation 
need to be taken into account. The dynamics of 
news coverage described here are the products of 
epistemological frameworks for defining what 
constitutes news—frameworks that are deeply 
ingrained in American journalism. The cumulative 
effects of coverage by traditional news organizations 
over many years have conditioned public opinion 
and the policy environment in a manner that has 
distorted issues and undermined the possibility 
of compromise. Changes in the media landscape 
accentuated these effects in traditional news 
organizations while also creating additional forms 
of expression that emphasize an advocacy of 
protest, an advocacy that has proven more adept 
at blocking policy initiatives than promoting them. 
In the most recent immigration debates, specific 
elements of the media performance facilitated, and 
even encouraged, polarization and gridlock. 
This interaction of persistent intellectual frameworks 
and revolutionary structural change has produced 
media coverage that impedes policy making on 
immigration and is likely to have the same impact 
on other issues. Although unique in many aspects, 
immigration shares some important characteristics 
with other issues, such as income security for the 
elderly, health care and energy. These are all issues 
that develop gradually over long periods of time 
and that are impelled by many different private 
actors who are responding to a variety of social 
and economic factors. And, these are all issues 
that require difficult compromises to produce 
new policy.
When the new migrant flows got under way, the 
media landscape was governed largely by journal-
istic norms that were developed in the mid-20th 
century and emphasized impartial reporting, 
nonpartisan independence and aggressive exercise 
of the press’s watchdog role. The publication of the 
Pentagon Papers and the uncovering of the 
Watergate scandal in the early 1970s represented 
the apogee of this kind of journalism, emerging 
from a media industry with a healthy economic 
base. At the time, a handful of major news 
organizations defined the standards and set the 
news agenda. The three commercial television 
networks, major metropolitan newspapers and the 
national newsmagazine exercised extraordinary 
reach and influence. 
Since then the media landscape has fragmented, 
and impartial journalism has been relegated to one 
of several common forms of conveying news. That 
is the result of continuous and accelerating 
transformation across many domains since the 
1980s, and a detailed accounting of this evolution 
is not our objective here. In sum, though, techno-
logical developments have multiplied the means by 
which information is received and have created a 
continuous, highly competitive, 24-hour news 
In the most recent immigration debates, specific 
elements of the media performance facilitated, 
and even encouraged, polarization and gridlock.
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cycle via cable, satellite and the Internet. Policy 
changes, such as repeal of the fairness doctrine, 
have opened the public broadcasting airwaves to 
new, often more partisan, voices. Both new 
technology (the Internet) and old technology 
(radio) have enabled participation by audiences 
that were once passive recipients of information. 
Social and demographic change, as exemplified by 
hyper-suburbanization and gentrification, have 
challenged the high-penetration, mass-market 
business model for metropolitan news outlets. 
And, the media have mirrored developments in 
the political arena as well. Heightened partisanship 
and the proliferation of less structured, often 
polarized, interest groups have all made it more 
difficult for news organizations to present a 
coherent news agenda that attracts broad consensus 
as a representation of contemporary realities 
and policy choices. 
To understand how the news media covered the 
current era of immigration and how that coverage 
might have influenced public opinion and policy-
making, we applied two well-established approaches 
to media analysis: assessments of agenda setting 
and framing. 
The concept of an agenda-setting function for the 
news media dates at least as far back as 1922, when 
Walter Lippmann argued in his seminal Public 
Opinion that by creating mental images of people, 
places and events that are never experienced 
directly, journalism shapes the way its audience 
thinks about public affairs. Since then, extensive 
empirical work has shown that the prominence 
awarded to a topic by the news media has a 
powerful influence on the importance given to that 
topic by the public.2 Simply put, the more attention 
that is paid to a topic in the media, the more likely 
the public will regard that topic as important. This 
agenda-setting role does not necessarily influence 
attitudes toward the topic or judgments about proper 
policies, but it does have an effect on whether 
people consider the topic worthy of concern and 
attention. In one of the early formulations of the 
agenda-setting theory, Bernard Cohen stated, in a 
1963 study of the media’s impact on foreign policy 
formation, that the press, “may not be successful 
much of the time in telling people what to think, 
but it is stunningly successful in telling them what 
to think about.”3 
The framing function takes the media’s influence 
another step. As W. Lance Bennett defines it, 
“Framing involves choosing a broad organizing 
theme for selecting, emphasizing, and linking the 
elements of a story. Frames are thematic categories 
that integrate and give meaning to the scene, the 
characters, their actions, and supporting docu-
mentation.”4 The framing function can be exer-
cised within a single story, for example, when 
candidates’ popularity is explained as a function 
of race or gender rather than by their positions on 
critical issues. Framing can have a cumulative 
effect; when stories about gang violence dominate 
coverage of crime, it gives the impression that 
gangs are primarily responsible for criminal 
violence. In addition, as Shanto Iyengar has 
demonstrated in studies of television news coverage, 
the media can portray events as singular and 
disconnected. “Episodic framing,” as he put it, 
prevents audiences from accumulating a sense 
of context and long-term trends.5 
This paper first examines news coverage of 
immigration from 1980 and 2007, to explore the 
… the more attention that is paid to a topic  
in the media, the more likely the public will  
regard that topic as important.
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broad narrative of the immigration story, and then 
focuses on the most recent round of stalled 
policymaking in 2006 and 2007 to assess the 
media’s direct impact on the policy process. This is 
not an effort to hunt out inaccuracies or bias in 
news coverage. It is not necessary for the news 
media to lean one way or another on an issue to 
have an effect on public affairs. Indeed, this study 
shows that if stalemate is a sign of failure in 
policymaking, the media can contribute mightily 
to the problem simply by making it more difficult 
to resolve the issues in any way. The evidence 
suggests that the transformation of the media has 
significantly strengthened this effect.
Even when this era of migration was just getting 
under way, the traditional news media covered it 
as a highly dramatic breaking story that would 
surge onto the agenda and then, just as quickly, 
recede. Illegal migration served as the issue’s 
dominant frame. In the 1990s, these tendencies 
were heightened by the onset of the 24-hour news 
cycle and the suddenly fierce competition between 
traditional journalism and cable television. As has 
been noted elsewhere, the new and the old forms 
of journalism fed off each other. Many news 
organizations, for example, did not set out to 
differentiate their products from CNN’s as much 
as they tried to compete directly by replicating 
what the cable network provided. This interaction 
became more pronounced as the Internet emerged 
as a major source of news dissemination, and, as 
we shall see in the next chapter, the result was even 
more episodic, crisis-oriented framing of the 
immigration story. 
Certainly, the new media have a powerful influence 
on traditional news organizations, but influence 
flowed in the other direction as well. In the 
congressional debates of 2006 and 2007, new media 
in the form of partisan pseudo-journalism on cable 
television, the Internet and talk radio borrowed 
much of their approach from the way traditional 
journalism had covered immigration for decades. 
The agenda-setting mode of episodic, dramatic 
coverage and the framing concept focused on acts 
of illegality were merely exaggerated to suit the new 
media. The subject matter was largely the same even 
as shrill advocacy dominated the delivery and 
traditional journalistic norms of verification and 
fairness were shredded.
The most recent congressional debates did, 
however, highlight a new development in the media’s 
social role, and the evidence comes from opposite 
sides of the issue. In 2006, the Spanish-language 
media found their political voice by stoking 
participation in the immigrant marches that took 
place that spring. Radio DJs suddenly found they 
could get thousands of people into the street and 
help block restrictionist policy proposals. Then in 
2007, talk radio and the Internet were equally 
successful in rallying pro-restrictionist public 
opinion to block policy proposals that would have 
opened the country to more immigrants. In both 
cases, these media succeeded in exercising a veto 
over new policies by mobilizing highly vocal 
minorities. If these occurrences of media activism 
portend a new model for direct intervention in 
congressional debates by media commentators and 
interest groups, then policy making by way of a 
grand bargain, whether in immigration or any 
other realm, may be a thing of the past. 
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THE IMMIgRaTION NaRRaTIvE 
 
all ElIaN, all THE TIME
The year 2000 will be remembered in the United 
States in many ways: a disputed presidential 
election; the waning halcyon days between the 
Cold War and 9/11; the peak of an economic 
expansion that pushed unemployment to its lowest 
point in three decades. And 2000 should also be 
remembered as a milestone in the history of the 
American population. That year, more than 
1.5 million people born abroad joined the 
U.S. population, according to the best available 
estimates. It was the largest single-year influx in 
the current era of migration and perhaps the 
largest in American history.1 
Immigration drew a good deal of attention from 
the news media in 2000, but the saga of a single 
9-year-old Cuban boy dominated coverage of the 
topic. The soap opera of Elian Gonzalez accounted 
for more than half (55 percent) of all the immigration 
coverage in The New York Times that year and 
about two-thirds (63 percent) of the immigration 
stories on the “CBS Evening News” and in the 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (66 percent).
By virtue of the attention it grabbed and the 
messages it conveyed, the Elian story is emblematic 
of the way American journalism has covered 
immigration across an entire era: The emphasis fell 
preponderantly on migration outside of authorized 
channels. Government actors emerged as inept 
and inconsistent. The most passionate voices in 
the public arena drew vivid representation. Public 
policy choices floundered in ambiguity. The overall 
impression was one of chaos, controversy and 
contradictions. And that is the overall impression 
of migration that the media have delivered to the 
American public for nearly three decades. That is 
the perception that has shaped public opinion and 
policymaking. As we shall see, that perception—
that misperception—derives from both the kinds 
of stories selected for coverage and the volume in 
which they were produced. 
While the media and their audiences focused 
relentlessly on Elian in 2000, a million and a half  
migrants entered the country largely unheralded 
and unnoticed. Taken altogether their many journeys 
changed the nation’s demographic destiny, while 
the Elian saga had no lasting impact.2 The stories 
about Elian were accurate enough individually; that 
is not the issue here. And it is easy to understand 
why the saga was so compelling to journalists and 
audiences alike, loaded as it was with drama, 
suspense, wacky characters and colorful locales. 
But while the media and the public obsessed over 
an irresistible little story, they were missing the 
much larger, much less dramatic, story that made 
history and whose consequences are still playing 
out. Even more is at stake, though. In the larger 
While the media and their audiences 
focused relentlessly on Elian in 2000, a million 
and half migrants entered the country largely 
unheralded and unnoticed.
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story of immigration, the Elian saga was exemplary 
of neither specific significant events nor public 
policy issues; it was far more an exception than the 
rule. And so the extraordinary attention focused 
on the Elian story created not only a distraction 
but also a distortion. Consumed by coverage of 
this uniquely weird little story, audiences could 
come away with very mistaken impressions about 
the enormous migration that was reaching a 
historic peak. 
Although there has never been another story quite 
like Elian’s, our analysis of immigration coverage 
since 1980 shows that it is emblematic of three 
trends that have characterized the way the media 
have presented the current wave of immigration to 
the American public:
n    The coverage has been episodic, driven by 
dramatic and exceptional events even when 
history was being made by ordinary, day-to-day 
events. Evidence of this can be seen in the 
volume of coverage. It spikes for congressional 
debate or for episodes like the Elian saga or the 
discovery that a Cabinet nominee employed a 
nanny who lacked a green card. Then it recedes. 
As an exercise of the agenda-setting function, 
the media have conditioned the public and 
policymakers to think of immigration as a 
sudden event, often tinged with the air of crisis. 
In reality, the flow of the foreign born has 
evolved gradually, even predictably, over time. 
n    The coverage has focused overwhelmingly on 
acts of illegality. People entering the country 
without authorization; government efforts to 
halt them and debates over what to do about 
them; acts of criminality by immigrants; 
corruption and incompetence in government 
agencies—these have been the topics that have 
dominated the news of immigration. Much less 
attention has been directed to problems with the 
legal immigration system, like massive backlogs 
in processing citizenship applications, the pace 
of assimilation among immigrants or the 
dependence of some high productivity industries, 
such as information technology, on immigrant 
workers. It is not a matter of whether stories 
cast immigration in a positive or a negative 
light—many stories about unauthorized 
migrants were sympathetic—rather it is a 
preoccupation with immigration as an illegitimate 
phenomenon that has characterized much of 
the coverage. As an exercise of the framing 
function, this pattern of coverage would logically 
cause the public and policymakers to associate 
the influx of the foreign born with violations of 
the law, disruption of social norms and failure 
by the public sector. 
n    Immigrants, in particular, but also policymak-
ers and advocates, have dominated the journal-
istic narratives to the exclusion of other critical 
actors, especially employers and consumers. At 
the simplest level, this has deprived the coverage 
of essential context by underemphasizing the 
role of the U.S. labor market in determining the 
size and characteristics of immigrant flows and 
overemphasizing the role of government. 
More broadly, the immigrant emerges as the 
protagonist of the drama, exercising his will over 
the nation. Meanwhile, the public is rendered 
as seemingly passive. When their attitudes toward 
immigration turn negative, audiences exposed 
to this kind of coverage can readily view 
immigrants as villains and themselves as victims. 
Distrust of government, a seeming accomplice or 
an incompetent protector, is a natural byproduct. 
These three tendencies in American journalism’s 
approach to immigration have defined a narrative 
that has been told and retold for decades. It is a 
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narrative that emerges out of crisis and confrontation 
rather than everyday life. It is a narrative haunted 
by failures to obey and enforce laws. The media 
have thus conditioned the American public to see 
immigration through a particular prism. This 
kind of coverage has not produced drastic turns 
in attitudes. Instead, it appears to have primed 
many Americans to associate immigration with 
controversy and consternation. When Washington 
policymakers revisit immigration after the 2008 
elections, coverage will increase again, and the public 
is likely to again react warily. It is a response to a 
story told thousands of times.
OOzINg vS. bREaKINg NEwS
The individual stories that made up this overarching 
narrative were not inaccurate, and the events 
chronicled were not necessarily unimportant. 
But neither of these conditions is necessary to 
yield a body of coverage that progressively builds 
a misrepresentation of a historic development, 
especially one that unfolds gradually over the 
course of many years and that is the accumulation 
of countless small events. Migration, whether it 
involves African-Americans moving out of the 
rural South or middle-class whites moving to the 
suburbs, is just that kind of development, and 
portraying it accurately requires a particular 
commitment of attention and resources on the 
part of journalism. The distinction was expressed 
by Eugene L. Roberts, a former editor at The 
Philadelphia Inquirer and The New York Times to 
whom the adjective “legendary” is often applied. 
“Many important stories don’t break,” he once said. 
“They seep, trickle and ooze. Let’s be sure we are 
covering the ooze.”3  
Immigration oozes, but it has been covered primarily 
as a breaking story. Thus, the highly eventful breaking 
news of the Elian saga drew greater coverage in 
2000 than the slow, gradual migration of more 
than 1.5 million people that same year. The broader 
effect is evident when examining the volume of 
coverage devoted to immigration over a long 
period of time. In this case, there are sharp peaks 
and steep declines because the coverage has been 
driven by a variety of highly dramatic events rather 
than the ongoing, epochal story of migration. Some 
of those events, such as enactment of major changes 
in immigration policy, have been of lasting 
importance; others, like flaps over the employment 
of illegal nannies by Cabinet nominees, have been 
sensational and short-lived. Even when such 
breaking stories are entirely newsworthy taken one 
at a time—which is generally the way they are 
assessed by editors—they are misleading when 
taken as a whole. 
To measure the pace of coverage, researchers 
associated with this report examined more than 
80,000 news stories produced by print, radio and 
television news organizations from 1980 to 2007 
(See Note on Methodology). Across all news 
organizations and all platforms, the pattern is the 
same: from year to year, even month to month, the 
volume of coverage spikes in response to set-piece 
events and unexpected incidents, then it recedes. 
Even as the underlying migration kept mounting 
and Washington continuously debated policy 
responses, media interest faded in the absence 
of dramatic occurrences that met the simplest 
definition of breaking news. A similar pattern emerges 
in each of the past three decades: spectacular, 
atypical events call attention to illegal immigration 
early in the decade as the U.S. economy falters, and 
then Washington reacts with a policy debate in 
mid-decade. 
The most recent of these cycles—the period that 
began with the Elian saga, continued through the 
September 11, 2001, attacks and their aftermath, 
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and culminated with the congressional debates of 
2006 and 2007—produced the greatest volume of 
coverage as well as some of the wildest fluctuations 
in the volume of coverage. Media interest in 
immigration has grown, but the propensity to treat 
the topic like a man-bites-dog story has only 
become more acute. In this regard, the most recent 
transformations in the media, through the rise of 
cable television, talk radio and the Internet, have 
reinforced old journalistic norms by magnifying 
distortions already evident in the coverage. 
To understand how traditional journalistic norms 
have influenced coverage of immigration, it is 
useful to start with a publication that acts as 
self-appointed guardian of those norms and that 
in fact exercises profound influence over news 
judgment in the entire profession. Although The 
New York Times has produced some of the most 
extensive and consistent coverage, the newspaper’s 
volume of coverage varies considerably. For 
purposes of this study, we examined only news 
stories produced in the paper’s Washington and 
national bureaus. We thus excluded metropolitan 
coverage and stories in opinion and feature sections. 
Over the course of 28 years, the volume ranged 
from 43 stories in 1991 to 217 in 2006. While the 
size of the foreign-born population grew steadily 
over this entire period, the volume of coverage 
varied considerably (see Chart Three) from year to 
year. Another way of illustrating the fluctuation 
is to calculate the percentage variation each year 
off that 28-year average of 102 stories a year. In 
Chart Four, this method again produces a series of 
peaks and valleys. Examining the pace of coverage 
across this same period by the Associated Press, 
a key source of information for many newspapers 
and radio stations shows a similar pattern 
(See Chart Five).
Archival material is less readily available and less 
complete for many other publications, and so the 
analysis of immigration coverage by other news 
organizations focuses on the years after 1990. 
Again and again a roughly similar pattern emerges 
from examination of coverage by the “CBS 
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Evening News” (see Chart Six) NPR’s “Morning 
Edition” and “All Things Considered,” USA Today, 
four major regional newspapers in different 
sections of the country (see Chart Seven) and four 
news agencies servicing major newspaper chains.
The peaks in coverage are all readily explained by 
major news events. The chronicle of these events 
renders a histrionic narrative entirely at odds with 
the underlying story of steady, uneventful migration. 
For three decades, there has been far more opera 
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than ooze in the way journalists have covered 
migration.
The 1980s 
Twenty years before the Elian saga, another 
seaborne migration from Cuba, the Mariel 
boatlift, dominated the news. Meanwhile, 
Haitians were illicitly floating to Florida. For 
the next several years, coverage perked up 
with periodic riots and disturbances by 
Cubans and Haitians held in detention  
centers and with the litigation that sought to 
get them freed. The chaotic migration in the 
Caribbean and its lingering consequences set 
the scene for an important and prolonged 
round of policymaking.
As the decade began, a congressional commis-
sion headed by the Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, 
president of Notre Dame University, produced 
recommendations for a policy overhaul, and 
Washington turned its attention to the issue 
soon after the Reagan administration took 
office in 1981. Repeated congressional debates 
stoked coverage until enactment of the 1986 
Immigration Reform and Control Act, also 
known as the Simpson-Mazzoli Act, a 
compromise formed of two major elements: 
on the one hand, it offered amnesty to most 
unauthorized migrants already in the country; 
and on the other hand, it sought to cut future 
flows by imposing, for the first time, sanctions 
on those who employ illegal workers. 
After the enactment of the 1986 bill, media 
coverage slackened and then dropped off 
significantly. The real news, however, did not. 
Implementation of employer sanctions proved 
problematical, with consequences that still 
resound today. The newly legalized migrants 
transformed Latino communities across the 
country. New, largely unauthorized migrant 
streams began flowing into the United States 
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as a result of civil wars in Central America, 
and within a few years illegal crossings from 
Mexico began to mount again despite the law’s 
enforcement provisions. Most important, the 
pace of legal immigration quickened as the 
U.S. economy accelerated its transformation 
from a manufacturing base into services and 
information. But in the absence of big 
set-piece events, media attention waned.
The 1990s 
As the decade began, the latest census 
demonstrated the underlying trends in the 
foreign-born population, which was up 40 
percent to 19.8 million, compared with 14.1 
million in 1980. Also in 1990, Washington 
enacted a law on legal immigration that would 
further boost the flow, but the legislation was 
passed in the midst of a budget crisis and went 
almost unnoticed. 
In the early 1990s, immigration coverage 
dipped to its low point for the entire quarter-
century studied here until a series of unrelated, 
highly dramatic events in 1993 produced a 
spike in coverage. President Bill Clinton had 
hardly taken office before his first two nominees 
for attorney general were knocked out of 
contention because they had employed 
unauthorized migrants as nannies. In February, 
terrorists who had successfully gamed the 
immigration system struck the World Trade 
Center. In June, the Golden Venture, a freighter 
carrying nearly 300 illegal migrants from China, 
ran aground off Queens. 
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Illegal entries across the border from Mexico 
and by sea from Haiti and then Cuba drew the 
media’s attention in 1994 as the federal 
government struggled on multiple fronts to 
exert control. The two states most affected—
California and Florida—mobilized to demand 
federal recompense for dealing with the 
unauthorized newcomers, culminating with 
California voters’ passage of the Proposition 
187 initiative in November 1994. (The 
initiative’s denial of many taxpayer-funded 
benefits for illegal immigrants was quickly 
struck down by federal courts). 
Responding to a public aroused by dramatic 
events and again acting in the wake of a 
recession, federal lawmakers took up immi-
gration policy in mid-decade once more. In 
1996, Congress adopted several immigration-
related measures that together formed another 
bargain: the flow of legal immigrants remained 
untouched and no efforts were made to improve 
the enforcement of employer sanctions, in 
exchange for measures that reduced legal 
immigrants’ access to social benefits and that 
made it easier to detain and deport foreigners 
who violated immigration laws.
Once again, media coverage dropped off after 
the laws were passed, and it remained essentially 
dormant until the next series of dramas brought 
immigration back to the front pages. In the 
meantime, however, the underlying trends were 
changing. While the media largely ignored 
immigration in the second half of the decade, 
the number of newcomers surged, partially as 
a result of increased illegal flows; meanwhile, 
the foreign-born population spread rapidly to 
areas that were benefiting from the boom 
times but that had no recent experience of 
immigration, such as the Southeast.  
The 2000s
As if on cue, little Elian arrived a month 
before the end of the millennium and brought 
immigration roaring back into the news until 
he finally was returned to Cuba in June 2000. 
A year later, census results again drew 
attention to the extraordinary growth of the 
foreign-born population (up 57 percent to 
31.1 million), and serious work was under 
way on a new immigration deal to legalize the 
undocumented flow, culminating in a visit to 
Washington by the Mexican president, Vicente 
Fox, in early September 2001. But, with Elian 
gone, immigration coverage slacked off. 
Then, on September 11, everything changed 
with immigration, as it did with much else. In 
one catastrophic stroke, the nation’s immigra-
tion controls were shown to be a failure and 
the foreign born were indelibly linked with 
mortal threats against every American’s 
well-being. These themes were pounded home 
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks as 
federal authorities conducted a dragnet for 
young males from Middle Eastern countries, 
increased the scrutiny of foreign students and 
moved all aspects of the immigration process, 
including the granting of citizenship, into the 
newly formed Department of Homeland 
Security. There was a burst of coverage that 
lasted less than 18 months, and then the media 
lost interest again from 2003 to 2005. When the 
roller coaster soared once more, the public found 
Congress locked in yet another policy debate 
as hundreds of thousands of immigrants marched 
through the streets of the nation’s cities.
The volume of Associated Press coverage of 
immigration in 1983 was almost a third lower than 
it had been in each of the prior three years before 
bouncing back in 1984 and 1985. The number of 
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editorials and opinion columns on immigration 
published by The Washington Post in 1993 was 
almost double what it had been the year before. 
News coverage by The New York Times in 2000 
was almost three times as high as it had been 1999, 
and the number of immigration stories in 2004 
was about half of what it had been in 2002. The 
combined output on immigration of the Cox, Copley 
and McClatchy news services in 2006 was nearly 
2½ times the amount it had been in 2004. On the 
“CBS Evening News,” coverage of immigration in 
1993 was nearly six times what it was in 1992, 
nearly three times as much in 2000 as in 1999.
A journalistic narrative that lurches brusquely 
between spikes in coverage is likely to create a 
forceful impression. Audiences will quite naturally 
come to associate the topic with the fast pace and 
high drama of breaking news. The larger truth of 
gradual demographic change can easily get lost when 
this pattern of coverage is repeated year after year, 
decade after decade. Such misimpressions not only 
apply to the way immigration and immigrants are 
perceived, but they also shape the policy environ-
ment. Primed by the pace of coverage, the public 
might logically assume that Washington is dealing 
with a crisis or a sudden threat when immigration 
debates make headlines. In fact, policymaking, like 
the growth of the foreign-born population itself, 
has developed slowly over the course of several 
years each time the subject has been addressed. 
THE SuRgE
The tendency toward hyperbolic coverage of 
policymaking has become more pronounced as 
the transformation of the media industry has 
gathered momentum, and it was most obvious in 
the most recent round of policymaking. In 1986, 
for example, when Congress enacted immigration 
legislation, coverage of the topic in The New York 
Times was 20 percent higher than the year before. 
In 1996, when Congress acted again, there was a 
37 percent boost over the preceding year. But then 
in the most recent round, coverage in 2006 spiked 
175 percent over the year before. The same pattern 
is evident in the coverage by many other news 
organizations. The combined coverage on National 
Public Radio’s “Morning Edition” and “All Things 
Considered” programs jumped by 67 percent in 
1996 versus the preceding year; in 2006, it more 
than tripled compared with the previous year. 
Associated Press coverage was up by 67 percent in 
1996 over the year before and by 128 percent in 
2006 compared with 2005. 
A variety of factors were undoubtedly at play in 
producing this pattern, but it is so consistent across 
so many news organizations that it is tempting to 
look for structural factors. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, the most recent immigration debate 
took place in a restructured media environment 
featuring, as never before, influential participation 
by cable television, talk radio and bloggers. That 
structural change appears to have accentuated the 
traditional journalistic tendency to focus on 
immigration when it is a subject of breaking news. 
As the media environment has become more 
crowded and varied, competition to cover hot 
topics has increased.
In 2007, the Senate debated immigration over the 
course of six weeks, from May 17 to June 28. The 
debate was preceded by nearly six months of 
negotiations that involved a variety of interest 
groups and legislators and that were widely known 
in official Washington. That prelude drew scant 
attention from the media, and then the coverage 
skyrocketed when the action moved to the Senate 
floor. The debate was undoubtedly an important 
event; the legislation under consideration was 
massive and consequential as will be discussed in 
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more detail below. For now our focus is on the media’s 
response as evidence of how much the coverage of 
immigration has come to be characterized by 
episodic spikes and how this tendency applies both 
to traditional news organizations and to the new 
voices of advocacy on cable television, talk radio and 
the Internet. However, in the realm of media advocacy, 
the volume of coverage differed significantly by 
ideology. Attention surged among conservatives 
and others who emphasized enforcement over any 
other policy concerns while there was comparatively 
little interest among liberal and progressive voices. 
As we shall see later in this report, that had a clear 
impact on the outcome of the debate.  
A detailed examination of media coverage of 
immigration in 2007, conducted by the Project for 
Excellence in Journalism (PEJ) for this report, shows 
that the volume of coverage across all media was 
roughly two to three times as high in May and June 
as it was the rest of the year. (Coverage increased 
less dramatically again in November when 
immigration briefly became a point of contention 
in the Republican presidential nomination fight.) 
The spike in coverage during the six weeks of the 
Senate debate occurred in all media sectors, making 
immigration the number one topic in the news for 
that period. In newspapers, for example, immigration 
accounted for 2 to 4 percent of front page stories in 
the first four months of the year and then jumped 
to 8 percent during the debate. By July, it was back 
to 2 percent and then disappeared in August and 
September. But, the surge was even more dramatic 
in two other sectors: cable talk and radio talk.
The PEJ analysis of coverage of prime time cable 
news shows on CNN, MSNBC and Fox News 
found that immigration filled 18.5 percent of the 
newshole during the Senate debate while it was in 
the 4 to 6 percent range for four months before 
and after. Even CNN’s Lou Dobbs, after making 
immigration a major topic for several years, nearly 
doubled his pace of coverage. For the year as a 
whole, Dobbs devoted 22 percent of his airtime to 
immigration and that share jumped to 43.1 percent 
during the debate. The spike was sharpest for any 
media sector in radio talk. Immigration skyrock-
eted from a negligible presence—zero in some 
months—to 22 percent during the Senate debate.
Talk radio also starkly illustrated the ideological 
divide among advocacy journalists, and the divide 
was not so much in their positions on the issues as it 
was on their level of interest. The PEJ analysis 
found that, during the six weeks of debate, 
conservative radio hosts devoted 31 percent of 
their newshole to immigration while their liberal 
counterparts hardly mentioned it, giving immigration 
just 3.6 percent of their airtime. Over the course 
of the entire year, immigration received four times 
as much attention from conservative talk show 
hosts than from liberals. In fact, liberal hosts gave 
more attention in 2007 to the Sen. Larry Craig 
airport men’s room imbroglio than to the topic  
of immigration. 
The volume of coverage varied according to 
ideology on cable television as well during the 
debate. Fox has achieved ratings dominance 
with a strong following among Republicans and 
conservatives. Immigration was a major story on 
Fox in primetime with Bill O’Reilly giving it 19.4 
percent of his show while Sean Hannity and Alan 
Colmes gave it 16.5 percent. On MSNBC, which 
has an audience less defined by partisan loyalties 
than Fox, there was no surge during the debate. 
The spike in coverage during the six weeks of  
the Senate debate occurred in all media sectors, 
making immigration the number one topic  
in the news for that period.
  A REPORT ON ThE MEDIA AND ThE IMMIgRATION DEbATE 21
Chris Matthews, for example, gave it only 5.1 percent 
of his newshole compared to the 48.5 percent he 
devoted to campaign coverage.
In the worlds of cable and radio talk the surge 
only happened on the right. The same was true in 
the blogosphere. 
Attention to immigration on five major blogs from 
across the political spectrum was assessed in a 
separate analysis conducted for this report at 
University of Southern California Annenberg 
School for Communication (See Note on Method-
ology). The five blogs were chosen because they 
rank among the popular in the sector, are pro-
duced by a single author or a small group of 
authors and have a clear political orientation. 
Nearly 14,000 posts appearing in the six months 
from February to June were examined, and for the 
five blogs the combined share of posts relating to 
immigration went from an average of 1.5 percent 
in February, March and April to 6 percent in May 
and 10 percent in June. Attention then fell back to 
3 percent in July. However the average is mislead-
ing because of stark difference according to the 
blogs’ political point of view.
On the liberal side of the spectrum, “Talking Points 
Memo” barely took note of the debate while the 
“Daily Kos” did increase its coverage but peaked at 
9 percent in June. “Instapundit,”  which is usually 
identified as libertarian in spirit, spiked coverage 
but only to six percent. Meanwhile on the right, 
“Michelle Malkin” showed a jump to 20 percent in 
May and then 40 percent in June. Similarly, another 
conservative blog, “Powerline,” surged to 13 percent 
in May and 17 percent in June. 
As will be discussed in more detail below, the 
advocacy journalists on cable and radio talk and in 
the blogosphere mirrored what was happening in 
Washington’s more formal political arena. Most 
liberals and progressives backed the Senate 
legislation but with a variety of reservations about 
its major provisions. Meanwhile, most conservatives 
opposed it adamantly. Weak support met fierce 
resistance and the bill was defeated. 
Source: USC-Annenberg Content Analysis
TablE ONE   PERCENTagE Of blOg POSTS ON IMMIgRaTION, fEbRuaRy 2007 – July 2007
DAILY KOS 
(LIbERAL)
TALKINg POINTS 
MEMO (LIbERAL)
INSTAPUNDIT 
(LIbERTARIAN)
MIChELLE MALKIN 
(CONSERvATIvE)
POWERLINE 
(CONSERvATIvE)
February 3% 1% 0% 3% 1%
March 3% 4% 0% 5% 2%
April 2% 1% 1% 4% 1%
May 4% 2% 3% 20% 13%
June 9% 3% 6% 40% 17%
July 4% 1% 1% 23% 2%
Over the course of the entire year, immigration 
received four times as much attention from 
conservative talk show hosts than from liberals. 
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The ideological differences in the coverage may 
also reflect another reality. Operating in a highly 
competitive atmosphere and still needing to build 
audiences, the new media of advocacy place a 
premium on attention-grabbing statements. The 
very nature of the media—broadcast talk and 
Internet posts—favor terse and intense expressions. 
As a result, these media sectors may be better 
suited for protest than for affirmation particularly 
when the subject is a complex issue that requires 
compromise in order to move forward. 
In the middle of the 1980s, the 1990s and again in 
this decade, Washington has turned its attention to 
the same basic policy issues involving immigration 
controls and unauthorized migration. Each time, 
the political maneuvering and the formulation of 
policy options has developed quite openly for several 
years with relatively little attention from the media. 
Then, when votes are going to be cast, the media 
spotlight has turned to Congress. The evolution of 
the media, however, has helped produce wilder 
swings in the volume of coverage. Sudden spikes in 
coverage of the sort that occurred during the last 
round of policy debates are likely to alarm audiences 
rather than to inform them, conditioned as they are 
to associating surges in volume with short-lived, 
sensational events and illegality.
THE fEEDbaCK lOOP
In 1980, when the number of unauthorized migrants 
living in the United States was less than a fourth of 
what it is today, John M. Crewdson of The New York 
Times earned a Pulitzer Prize for stories about 
abuses suffered by illegal aliens. The abuses came 
at virtually every level, from smugglers who snuck 
them into the country, to employers who exploited 
them, immigration officials who were incompetent 
and corrupt, and policymakers in Washington who 
struggled ineffectually to develop policies that 
would control the illicit flow. Of the 12 other 
Pulitzer Prizes in journalism awarded since then 
for coverage related to U.S. immigration, all but two 
focused on illegal migrants or malfeasance in the 
way government dealt with the foreign born. As we 
shall see, these topics have dominated immigration 
coverage for nearly three decades, producing an 
overarching narrative of illicit acts and government’s 
failed efforts to contend with them. 
Like the penchant to ride waves of breaking news 
rather than cover the steady flows of demographic 
change, age-old predilections drive coverage to crime 
and malfeasance. Distraction and distortion have 
accumulated inexorably as these journalistic reflexes 
are applied to migration coverage decade after decade. 
As with the spikes in coverage described above, 
these tendencies in news coverage have become 
even more pronounced in recent years as the media 
have undergone a profound structural transformation. 
Since the rise of the penny press in the mid-19th 
century, crime has been an essential element of 
mass-market journalism. Even while taking a less 
sensational approach than down-market tabloids, 
the traditional mainstream news organizations that 
set norms in the 20th century made crime a regular 
and prominent topic in their news coverage. As new 
media forms developed, cable television in particular 
leaned heavily on crime, and in the competition for 
audience, this in turn influenced mainstream news. 
The continuous, breathless coverage of the O.J. 
Simpson saga on cable television in the mid-1990s 
was in the most egregious traditions of mass-market 
journalism, for example, and it prompted expansive 
coverage in newspapers and broadcast television. 
Thus, the old media and the new media sometimes 
appear to be operating in a mutually reinforcing 
feedback loop. Lines of causality are difficult to 
draw, but the increasingly episodic coverage of 
immigration as a whole and the emphasis on 
illegality may be examples of this process at work. 
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CNN’s Lou Dobbs describes himself as an “advocacy 
journalist” and he makes no bones about disregard-
ing the traditional norms of journalistic neutrality 
while hosting CNN’s evening news broadcast.4 
Since November 2003 when he launched his “Broken 
Borders” series, Dobbs has crusaded on the issue 
of illegal immigration with increasing intensity, 
reaching a crescendo during the 2006 and 2007 
congressional debates with daily coverage. His focus 
on the illegal aspects of immigration is in keeping 
with tendencies evident in coverage by traditional 
news organizations over many years even if his 
explicitly biased approach to the subject, his lapses in 
verification and his haranguing style of presentation 
are obvious departures from the standards of 
journalism. Nonetheless, his agenda seems to have 
influenced coverage in traditional news organizations. 
Dobbs and other advocacy journalists on cable 
television, talk radio and the Internet have 
uncritically promoted fringe groups espousing 
get-tough policies on immigration, most notably 
the Minuteman Project.
Periodically over the years, going back at least to 
the early 1990s, irate citizens have protested illegal 
immigration with watchdog actions along the border 
with Mexico, sometimes shining car headlights on 
illicit crossers, or calling in sightings to the Border 
Patrol or actually trying to detain the migrants in 
some cases. Most have come and gone, attracting 
no more than passing notice. The Minuteman 
Project was one such group with no apparent base 
of support in any community or track record of 
political action when they suddenly began to draw 
national attention. Jerry Seper, a veteran reporter 
for The Washington Times who writes extensively 
about the restrictionist side of the immigration 
debate, seems to have given the group its first 
publicity with a story on January 24, 2005 about 
plans for a border protest in Arizona in the spring. 
Dobbs immediately picked up on the Minuteman 
Project, giving it favorable, sometimes extensive 
coverage on twelve broadcasts over the next two 
months. Rush Limbaugh and others in conservative 
talk started paying attention as well, and before the 
Minuteman Project had actually done anything 
President Bush expressed his worries about 
“vigilantes” on the border stoking more talk. 
When the protest was actually staged on April 1, 
turnout was below the promoters predictions—
scores rather than hundreds turned up according 
to eyewitness press accounts. Nonetheless, the event 
generated a bounty of coverage by the traditional 
media, more than 100 stories in national and regional 
newspapers, airtime on evening television, the 
spectacle of satellite trucks lined up to see angry 
people in combat fatigues waiting, often vainly, for 
someone to run through the brush from south to 
north. Absent the attention and controversy 
generated by Dobbs and other advocacy journalists, 
it seems unlikely that traditional news organizations 
would have given so much coverage to a relatively 
small symbolic protest.     
THE NaRRaTIvE Of IllEgalITy
Unauthorized migrants accounted for a fifth of the 
foreign-born population in 1980. By the early 1990s, 
that share dropped significantly because the 1986 
immigration reform law had provided amnesty for 
some 3 million of them, about 60 percent of the 
total. Since then, the unauthorized population has 
grown rapidly but so has the number of  legal 
immigrants. As a result, the unauthorized now 
account for less than a third of the foreign-born 
population in the U.S. and that is a peak reached 
only in recent years. 
However, the unauthorized segment of the 
foreign-born population has drawn an outsized 
share of the news coverage. Migrants who have 
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arrived outside of legal channels, whether it is by 
foot across the Mexican border or by raft across 
the Straits of Florida, have drawn much more 
coverage than those who have arrived with 
passports in hand. As a result, the cumulative 
portrait drawn by nearly 30 years of American 
journalism emphasizes illegal or uncontrolled 
migration rather than the much larger movement 
of people that has been legal and orderly. This 
emphasis on illegality applies not only to the means 
by which people enter the country but also to their 
activities once here. From prison riots by Marielitos 
in the early 1980s to murders committed by the 
Mara Salvatrucha street gangs in this decade,  
criminality by migrants has been another recurring 
and pervasive theme. People who break the law 
inevitably draw more attention from journalists 
than the multitudes who obey the law, and when 
those lawbreakers are identifiable as members of a 
group by virtue of national origin, race or nativity 
or all three, stereotyping is equally inevitable. 
In addition, coverage of the government’s role in 
regard to immigration has been dominated by 
efforts to devise and implement policies to control 
unauthorized migration. This coverage has 
overshadowed important legislation and policy 
processes in the realm of legal migration that have 
had much larger and longer-lasting effects on the 
nation. Like the overall emphasis on illegal 
migration, this has produced a distraction. Scant 
coverage of the laws, policies and bureaucracies 
governing legal migration has meant that the 
public has been less attuned to government’s role 
in the epochal changes legal immigration has 
brought to all realms of American society. Instead 
of focusing on the policies and practices that have 
had the greatest impact—those regarding legal 
migration flows—the news media have been 
preoccupied, in both their breaking news coverage 
and in their enterprise and investigative reporting, 
with efforts to control illegal flows. Thus, an 
element of distortion has also developed from 
coverage of government’s role.
These conclusions are based on a content analysis 
that examined coverage by a variety of news 
organizations across the full time period under 
discussion here (See Note on Methodology). 
That coverage is very clearly dominated by various 
forms of illegality: unauthorized entry to the U.S. 
and efforts by the government to control it; 
criminal behavior by immigrants; and malfeasance 
or incompetence by immigrations officials. For 
example, an analysis of 1,848 Associated Press 
stories on immigration topics from 1980 to 2007 
showed that 79 percent fit into the framework of 
illegality. Of 2,614 stories on immigration in The 
New York Times over the same period, 86 percent 
dealt with illegality in various forms, and that 
included 83% of the coverage in Washington and 
88% of the stories from elsewhere in the country. 
Of 381 stories about immigration on the “CBS 
Evening News” from 1990 to 2007, 87 percent fit 
the framework of illegality. And results from other 
news organizations show the same pattern. 
One flaw in this body of coverage stands out: The 
story of legal immigration has been underplayed 
relative to the illicit flow. The arrival of tens of 
millions of foreigners over the past three decades 
through legal channels—their success and failures, 
their contributions and costs—has received only 
a fraction of the coverage accorded to the much 
smaller number of unauthorized migrants. 
Government policies and practices regarding legal 
immigration have also received a scant share of 
media attention. Even government failures have 
received less attention when they relate to legal 
immigration, such as persistent backlogs in 
processing citizenship and visa applications, than 
those involving illegal immigration. For example, 
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in 1990 Congress passed the first major revision of 
legal immigration statutes in 35 years, substan-
tially increasing migration flow and changing its 
composition. It is legislation that from the start 
altered the face of America, and it continues to do 
so today. The Washington Post covered the debate 
leading up to enactment with a total of 2,078 words 
of news copy in four routine Capitol Hill stories; 
the bill’s potential impact was not examined in 
Washington’s newspaper of record until a week 
after it was passed. In contrast, when Congress 
produced a law dealing exclusively with illegal 
immigration in 1986, the Post published ten stories 
about the deliberations in the month prior to passage 
and seven follow ups in the immediate aftermath.
Our analysis shows that the framing on illegality 
in the traditional news media has been highly 
consistent going back nearly three decades despite 
substantial fluctuations in volume. In the pages 
of The New York Times, for example, the share of 
immigration stories focused on illegality held with 
a range of 76 to 96 percent for 24 of the 28 years 
examined, and in those four other years it never fell 
below 63 percent. The results were similar for the 
Associated Press, 24 years between 77 and 93 percent 
of stories related to illegality and four outliers. 
A new element was added to the narrative of 
illegality early in this decade, and Lou Dobbs on 
CNN was its most notable proponent. Advocates 
of tougher enforcement measures have long 
castigated illegal migrants as a drain on public 
services, as economic opportunists willing to 
undercut wages, and as eroding the rule of law. 
Dobbs led the way in characterizing illegal migrants 
as threats to the health and safety of ordinary 
Americans, as a category of people who are not 
merely undesirable but who need to be expelled 
in order to preserve the nation. Dobbs is by no 
means an original thinker. He has aped some of 
nativism’s oldest tropes, but he has done it as the 
anchor of the flagship broadcast on a network that 
promotes itself as “the most trusted name in news.” 
He has frequently used the language of conquest, 
an “army of invaders” to describe the migrants, 
and has described native-born U.S. citizens as 
“anchor babies,” alleging incorrectly that having 
a child here will protect an illegal immigrant from 
deportation. Dobbs has accused unauthorized 
migrants with infecting the American population 
with a variety of diseases, including leprosy, and 
when confronted with factual errors on such 
accounts, as he was by Lesley Stahl during an 
interview for “60 Minutes” on CBS, he has been 
defiant, telling Stahl, “if we reported it, it’s a fact.” 
Dobbs, who has generated notable ratings gains 
for CNN, was subsequently given a slot by CBS 
doing weekly commentary on “The Early Show.” 
And, Dobbs has not stood alone. Bill O’Reilly on Fox 
News has repeatedly recounted crimes committed 
by illegal migrants as evidence of failed immigration 
policies, growing melodramatic at times as in an 
infamous shouting match with his colleague, Geraldo 
Rivera, in April 2007.  “You want open-border 
anarchy; that’s what you want,” O’Reilly shouted 
when Rivera tried to argue that a drunk driver’s 
immigration status was not relevant to his crime.  
Michelle Malkin, a prominent conservative blogger 
and Fox commentator, took the same tack in a 
January 2008 post that was headlined, “Twice-
deported illegal alien criminal is Arizona serial 
rapist suspect: The bloody consequence of open 
borders, part 9,999,999.”
This rhetorical assault on illegal immigration has 
been directed not only at migrants but also at the 
government and often in more vociferous terms. 
For example, in an April 2007 broadcast, O’Reilly 
framed illegal immigration as a massive betrayal 
by the public sector: “The founders created 
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government to provide that protection. But our 
governments generally have bowed to political 
correctness and are failing to protect us.” This 
argument has proved highly successful both in 
attracting audiences and arousing them in ways 
that has affected policymaking. Dobbs again offers 
a way to illustrate the development of this line of 
advocacy journalism. 
As anchor of CNN’s “Moneyline” in the 1980s and 
1990s, Dobbs played the sycophantic host to big 
business executives. When he talked about 
immigration, which was not very often compared 
to his more recent obsession, Dobbs often acted as 
transmitter for the business community’s general 
view of immigration as a necessary source of new 
workers. Then after the era of corporate scandals 
made it hard to treat corporate chieftains like 
glamorous and admired celebrities, Dobbs 
reinvented himself as a populist. As anchor of 
“Lou Dobbs Tonight” since 2003, he has made 
illegal immigration just one aspect of a broader 
critique of greedy businesses and failed government. 
In addition to “Broken Borders,” his running 
diatribes come with titles like “War on the Middle 
Class,” “Exporting America” and “The Best 
Government Money Can Buy.” As with other 
advocacy journalists, Dobbs uses the pose of a 
reporter uncovering facts in the public interest  
as a rhetorical device. His stories on illegal 
immigration often come with the suggestion that 
it suits hidden interests with conspiratorial 
schemes. He has repeatedly argued, for example, 
that the unauthorized flow is tolerated, even 
encouraged, because powers in Washington and 
in the corporate world have plans to surrender 
American sovereignty in a “North America Union” 
with Mexico and Canada. The absence of any 
evidence for this claim has not hindered its 
frequent repetition.
This kind of framing has a direct bearing on the 
way policy options are portrayed. When a bipartisan 
group of senators announced that they would 
propose a compromise bill on immigration in 
May 2007, thus opening the most recent round of 
congressional debate, Dobbs started his broadcast 
with this bulletin: “The pro-illegal alien and open 
borders lobby today winning what is an apparent 
major political victory. A bipartisan group of 
senators announcing a deal to give as many as 20 
million illegal aliens amnesty. There are rising 
concerns tonight that that amnesty compromise 
could threaten national sovereignty and security, 
opening U.S. borders even further with Mexico 
and Canada.”
Washington has manifestly failed in its stated aims 
of controlling, let alone ending illegal migration. 
The size and continued growth of the unauthorized 
population attest to that. The key question about 
the framing of immigration coverage is not a 
matter of accuracy but of attitudes. Specifically one 
has to ask whether the coverage has heightened 
skepticism about immigration policy in a way that 
makes the enactment of new policies more difficult. 
As we shall see later in this report, there is abun-
dant evidence from the most recent congressional 
debate that doubts about the government’s ability 
to control immigration became one of the major 
arguments against enactment of comprehensive 
reforms. Sen. John McCain put it simply, explaining 
why Congress failed to formulate a new policy in 
2007: “Many Americans did not believe us when 
we said we would secure our borders, and so we 
failed in our efforts.” There is no ready means to 
measure how much journalism has contributed to 
this perception through the way it has framed a 
narrative of illegality. But it certainly has been a 
factor. So, too, has been another characteristic of 
the immigration coverage: misplaced protagonism. 
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MIgRaNTS aS PERPETRaTORS
A rich body of historical and social science literature 
has amply demonstrated that large-scale, continuous 
migrations almost always results from the interaction 
of many factors. These include individual will and 
motivations, but the causes of migration go far 
beyond the individual. At the simplest level, 
migration is the product of push factors—political, 
social, economic  and environmental factors that 
cause people to want to leave their communities of 
origin—and pull factors—those that attract them 
to a given destination such as local demand for a 
particular type of labor. When a migration has 
developed over years, it can also generate its own 
momentum as migrants seek to reunite with their 
families and as economic ties develop between 
sending communities and their diaspora. Suffice 
to say that beyond oozing, immigration is multidi-
mensional. And American journalism is no better 
suited to covering stories that are multidimensional 
than it is to those that develop gradually.
All storytelling, whether factual or fictional, is 
easiest when narratives can be constructed around 
the actions of a single person or a group of people. 
Narratives beg for protagonists, whether they are 
heroes or villains, victims or perpetrators. This 
imperative can have particularly perilous 
consequences when applied to a phenomenon like 
migration, and yet migration lends itself to simple 
narratives in which the migrant is the obvious 
protagonist. After all, moving from one country 
to another provides a clear plot with a beginning, 
middle and end. It is the kind of dramatic action 
that readily drives narratives, especially when it 
involves physical peril or acts of illegality or both. 
But, even though the migrants attract the spotlight, 
an excessive emphasis on them tends to obscure 
the many social forces that impel their actions. 
The result can be a deceptive oversimplification. 
Taking account of all the factors that produce 
migration is, of course, beyond the scope of any 
single news story, but over an extensive body of work, 
one could hope to see a balance of the individual 
and societal factors. Instead, the impulse to develop 
narratives with migrants as the protagonists has 
proved irresistible for an entire generation of 
journalists. The story told repeatedly, until it has 
become a cliché, is of the individual migrating to 
seek a better life. Whether portrayed sympathetically 
or not, the migrant is the protagonist who deter-
mines the arc of the narrative. The nation or the 
community at the end of this arc—the destination 
for the migrant’s journey—is a fundamentally 
passive party. When that narrative is repeated over 
and over again, an audience in that nation or 
community will come to see itself as a bystander. 
When migration is portrayed as the migrant’s doing, 
then all the consequences of migration befall the 
migrant. And when perceptions turn negative, 
those consequences are all the migrants’ fault and 
the receiving community will come to see itself as 
a hapless victim.
THE agENTS Of DEMOgRaPHIC CHaNgE
The predominant role given to immigrants in the 
journalistic narrative is evident in stories about 
demographic change, particularly those dealing 
with change in the racial and ethnic makeup of the 
U.S. population. Headlines regularly shout that the 
foreign born and Hispanics are becoming ever 
bigger shares of the U.S. population and that the 
nation is undergoing a fundamental shift in 
composition that could render whites a minority 
by mid-century. These statements are undeniably 
true, and they are the result of two distinct but 
equally important phenomena: the size of the 
newcomer groups is growing, and the historical 
populations are not. That is the dual dynamic that 
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is producing social change; it is important to take a 
moment with the demographic data to underscore 
this point. According to the Census Bureau 
estimates, the American population grew by 20 
million between 2000 and 2007 and Hispanics 
accounted for half the growth.5 That is the story 
that generates coverage. But, there is another 
important statistic in those estimates that is 
essential to understanding the story. Non-Hispanic 
whites, numbering nearly 200 million only 
contributed 2 million people to the population 
growth by an excess of births over deaths. In fact, 
immigration by non-Hispanic whites was almost 
an equally significant factor, producing growth of 
1.4 million people. But, in repeatedly reporting 
that Hispanics or the foreign born are becoming 
an ever greater share of the population, journalists 
have usually declined to mention that the share is 
increasing both because these populations are 
growing and because other populations are not. 
The coverage has focused only on the first factor, 
depriving this news of an essential element 
of context.
Increases in the numbers of Hispanics and foreign 
born have made a lot of news especially since the 
2000 census captured a spurt of rapid growth in 
late 1990s. By contrast, a declining birthrate 
among whites and African-Americans is an old 
story, but it is just the kind of phenomenon that 
oozes, accumulating impact relentlessly over long 
periods of time. By emphasizing only one of the 
two factors, the American media have given the 
false impression that the newcomers alone are 
bringing about the demographic change. Ameri-
cans uncomfortable with this shift will naturally 
lay blame on those portrayed as the protagonists. 
We examined coverage of three census reports 
that quantified the change in the nation’s mix of 
peoples: the initial data releases from the 2000 
census documenting the growth of the Hispanic- 
and foreign-born populations; a 2003 report 
showing that the number of Hispanics had 
outstripped the number of African-Americans to 
make Latinos the nation’s largest minority; and a 
2005 report projecting that non-whites would 
become a majority of the nation’s population by 
2050. The analysis examined stories produced 
by The Washington Post, The New York Times, 
USA Today, a sampling of 23 regional and local 
newspapers, the Associated Press, National Public 
Radio and the three broadcast networks. Of a 
total of 71 stories about the growing shares of 
newcomers, only 12 mentioned higher birthrates 
relative to the historical populations and none of 
them noted this fact any higher than the fourth 
paragraph. None of those 12 mentioned that 
birthrates among whites and African-Americans 
have declined over the period in which the 
immigrant population has been growing. And, 
in these number-heavy stories, only two of the 
12 cited actual birthrate statistics. Fifteen other 
stories noted that the newcomers have high 
birthrates, adding to their population growth, 
but they made no mention of the lower birthrates 
among whites and blacks. The remaining 44 stories 
did not mention births as a factor in any way. 
The message in this body of coverage is that 
immigration is changing the face of the nation 
and that “they” are doing it to us.
But, in repeatedly reporting that Hispanics  
or the foreign born are becoming an ever  
greater share of the population, journalists have  
usually declined to mention that the share is  
increasing both because these populations are  
growing and because other populations are not. 
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lEavINg EMPlOyERS OuT Of  
THE PICTuRE
Changes in the composition of the population 
relate to the effects of immigration. The same kinds 
of misimpression have been generated in coverage 
of the causes of immigration. 
The migration narrative produced by American 
journalism has significantly undervalued the role 
the United States itself has played in stimulating 
and shaping the influx. In particular, media 
coverage has underplayed the importance of the 
U.S. labor market in determining the size and 
content of migration flows over many years. The 
foreign born in general, and especially the young 
males from Latin America who make up the bulk of 
the illegal flow, have among the highest labor force 
participation rates of any group, given that work is 
often their primary reason for being here.6 And, not 
surprisingly, the actual size of that flow varies from 
year to year according to demand for these kinds 
of workers. When employers need more workers 
during economic expansions, the flow increases; 
during economic downturns, fewer migrants come.7 
Washington policymakers of both parties and 
across several administrations have recognized 
these realities—at least symbolically—since the 
onset of the new migration. The need to make the 
“jobs magnet” less attractive had been a prominent 
feature of federal debates about the control of 
illegal immigration since the mid-1970s. In 1986 
Congress enacted sanctions against the employers 
of unauthorized migrants as the centerpiece of an 
enforcement strategy. Worksite enforcement has 
remained a central tenant of U.S. immigration 
policy, even though business lobbyists ensured 
that the 1986 law was written in a way that makes 
it impossible to enforce.8 In 1990, business 
associations played a highly influential role in 
shaping legislation to boost the flow of legal 
immigrant workers, and in 1996 they helped 
defeat efforts to toughen employer sanctions.9  
During the most recent debate, agricultural interests, 
the hospitality industry, builders and others worked 
hard to shape the various proposals considered by 
Congress. With support from the Bush adminis-
tration, employers insisted that measures to crack 
down on the hiring of illegal workers be balanced 
by a program providing a substantial new flow of 
immigrant temporary workers. The efforts to strike 
a grand bargain collapsed in part because of 
disputes over the rules that would have governed 
the wages, freedom of movement and ultimate 
immigration status of these temporary workers. 
Following the breakdown of the debate, when the 
Bush administration launched an enforcement 
campaign to show it was serious about immigration 
control, the target became the migrants rather than 
the employers. Dozens of worksite raids have 
resulted in thousands of deportations, but as of 
this writing no major prosecutions have been 
brought against the employers who flaunted the 
law when they gave the workers a reason to come 
to the United States and the means to live here.
So employers play two important roles in the 
migration drama: in their individual, everyday 
decisions on whom to hire, employers exercise as 
much control over migration flows as federal 
immigration authorities—more control, actually, if 
you consider the illegal flow that circumvents the 
authorities. And, America’s employers, acting both 
directly and through lobbyists, have explicitly 
influenced the development of immigration policies 
over the past three decades to ensure a supply of 
foreign workers, including a sizable number 
outside the legal immigration system. Despite their 
importance, however, employers have been largely 
offstage and unseen in the migration drama as it 
has been portrayed by the U.S. media. Of course, 
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there have been important exceptions—excellent 
stories on specific industries, employers and the role 
of work in attracting immigrants—but our intent here 
is to understand the broad narrative that emerges 
from the bulk of the coverage. From that perspective, 
American journalism at best has not fully in-
formed the public and at worst has misled it.   
As with all media, the three broadcast networks 
ramped up their coverage of immigration in 2006 
and 2007 when it became the subject of congressional 
debate. But even during this spike, employers drew 
little attention. An analysis of the 201 stories about 
immigration that were aired on the three broadcast 
networks’ flagship evening news shows in 2006 and 
2007 found that employers were quoted in only 12 
stories. In contrast, immigrants were interviewed or 
made statements in 58 stories. On the policy side, 
only seven stories made mention of employer 
sanctions, and it was a minor element in most of 
them. Meanwhile, 29 of the stories on the evening 
news broadcasts were about the border and the 
federal government’s failed efforts there. 
This same distorted narrative, however, is also 
apparent in coverage that is set in the American 
communities and focuses on local issues.
Over the past two decades, a burst of extraordinary 
economic development and population growth in 
Northern Virginia has coincided with the rise of a 
new immigrant population, mostly from Central 
America. Established white, middle-class, suburban 
populations found themselves contending with 
rapid population change. In several communities, 
this produced widespread anxieties and some 
public displays of animosity toward the newcomers. 
In response, local governments have attempted to 
impose their own immigration controls with a variety 
of measures such as closing down day-labor hiring 
sites or denying public services to unauthorized 
migrants. A similar course of events has played out 
in many other communities across the country. 
An analysis of a sample of 312 articles published 
by The Washington Post from 2004 to 2007 on 
immigration controversies in Northern Virginia 
found that only 14 focused on the employment of 
immigrants or their economic impact, and only 
four out of the total that actually quoted individual 
employers. This omission from the vast majority of 
the coverage is all the more extraordinary because 
much of the controversy was about day laborers, 
and thus the migration issue was framed specifically 
as a matter of employment. Nonetheless, two 
lengthy stories charting the demographic and 
social impact of the new immigration on different 
communities failed to make any mention of 
migrants’ employment at all. As the home construc-
tion industry collapsed, the Post ran a telling piece 
about how immigrants were leaving the area 
because their jobs were vanishing. The story quoted 
four migrants talking about their experiences, but 
it did not quote a single employer. The Washington 
Post had never paid much attention to the link 
between a booming economy and a sudden 
increase in the immigrant population before it 
found that economic hard times were causing 
some of the newcomers to leave. And along the 
way, attention was never focused on the people 
who hired the immigrants.  
When employers are absent from migration 
narratives like the Post’s coverage of the Northern 
Virginia controversies, a critical element of context 
is missing from the story. It is as if the audience 
was hearing only half of a conversation, or more 
appropriately, half of a transaction. The missing 
half is the part that explains the role that the 
audience, the community itself, has played in 
bringing about the migration to the extent it has 
benefited from the immigrants’ employment. But 
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the coverage was focused elsewhere. While only 14 
stories focused on employment, 62 focused on the 
reaction—most of it negative—that the immigrant 
influx and attendant controversies had provoked 
among residents, and 54 stories focused on the 
political impact. The bulk of the coverage—142 
stories of the 312 assessed—focused on debates, 
decisions and actions by public officials. Thus, the 
policy disputes as they were worked out in 
governmental settings were the overwhelming focus 
of the coverage, outstripping employment, the 
primary cause of the influx, by a factor of 10 to 1. 
Whether intended or not, the message of this 
narrative is that immigrants have provoked a crisis 
in public policy that is disassociated from any 
underlying social, demographic or economic 
trends. Moreover, it is framed as a crisis that can 
be resolved by policies aimed primarily, if not 
exclusively, at the immigrants without addressing 
the larger dynamics that produced the migration. 
This kind of framing would be almost inconceivable 
on other issues. Imagine, for example, coverage of 
a policy debate over energy that did not prominently 
feature oil and automobile companies or coverage 
of a health policy debate that did not delve into the 
roles of hospitals, doctors and pharmaceutical 
companies. In the case of immigration, the media’s 
failure to adequately provide context for the policy 
challenges has produced both lack of understand-
ing and frustration with government’s inability to 
resolve them. As we shall see, this dynamic 
contributed directly to the failure of the most recent 
efforts to produce new immigration policies.
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THE ROaD TO STalEMaTE 
 
gRaND baRgaINS  
aND a wEaKENED waSHINgTON
Using an extraordinary forum often associated 
with foreign crises, President Bush addressed the 
nation from the Oval Office on the evening of May 
15, 2006, to press his case for immigration reform. 
Sitting behind the great Resolute desk hewn from 
the timbers of a British navy ship, he announced 
the deployment of 6,000 National Guard troops to 
help patrol the border with Mexico. Although it 
was a rare use of an Oval Office address on a 
matter of domestic policy, and the first ever on 
immigration, an air of crisis prevailed nonetheless. 
Despite progress, he said, “we do not yet have full 
control of the border.” But the emergency Bush 
faced that night was not along the Rio Grande or 
in the deserts of the Southwest, but on Capitol Hill.
“Tonight,” the president said, “I want to speak 
directly to members of the House and Senate.” 
Nearly two-and-a-half years had passed since 
Bush had unveiled his proposals in the East Room 
speech of January 2004. In the meantime, conser-
vatives in his own party had gone into open revolt 
against his plan, with the House Republican leader-
ship ramming through a tough enforcement-only 
bill in December 2005. That prompted hundreds of 
thousands of demonstrators to march through 
dozens of U.S. cities in the spring of 2006 in protest. 
And then, as Bush spoke, the Senate was considering 
a broader set of measures that included a version of 
the temporary worker program he had originally 
proposed. The legislative calendar required the 
Senate to act within a few weeks for there to be any 
chance of reconciling the House and Senate bills 
and getting final passage before that Congress 
ended its term following the November elections. 
Like many in Washington before him, Bush was 
trying to strike a grand bargain on immigration. 
In addition to sending troops to the border, he 
proposed several other enforcement measures 
aimed at mollifying conservatives—more high-tech 
sensors and Border Patrol agents to catch illegal 
crossers and more facilities for detention and 
deportations to send them home. To keep those on 
the other side of the debate onboard, he endorsed 
plans to offer a path to citizenship to unauthorized 
migrants of long residence in the country if they 
had jobs and clear criminal records and if they 
paid fines as penance for their wrongdoing. Border 
enforcement had gotten token attention in his 
initial proposals, and in 2004 he had not offered a 
legalization plan that clearly led to citizenship. In 
trying to forge a compromise, the president and 
his allies had to satisfy the vociferous factions on 
each side of the debate. Indeed, the political strategy 
behind comprehensive immigration reform was to 
create a big legislative package that included 
measures that separately would satisfy opposing 
factions with strongly held views rather than 
building a centrist proposal that would win 
majority support for all its elements. Each side had 
to get enough of what it wanted to let the opposition 
get what it wanted. But that has been the nature of 
U.S. immigration politics for a long time.
In its broad outlines, what Bush proposed was not 
unlike the bargain struck in 1986 or even the 
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deal-making behind the legislation passed in 1996. 
It was basically the old “close the back door, open 
the front door” strategy proposed by the Hesburgh 
Commission in 1980 when the new era of immi-
gration was still young. But by 2006, much had 
changed. The migration had grown large, and over 
the years the illegal flow that had gained great 
momentum despite repeated proclamations from 
Washington that it would be brought under 
control. Moreover, the American public had been 
primed by events—from Elian to the post-9/11 
roundups—and by media coverage to associate 
immigration with chaos and controversy. Finally, 
the media themselves had changed in ways that 
make it more difficult for Washington to resolve a 
public policy issue that requires a grand bargain. 
When views harden among opposing factions, 
striking such a deal can become impossible even 
if a majority wants to take action of some kind. 
That night in May 2006, Bush was trying to soften 
the hard edges.
As is customary, the White House scheduled an 
event the day after the president’s speech to try 
to build some political momentum. In this case, 
however, there was no town hall meeting in the 
heartland, no Rose Garden photo op with congres-
sional allies. Instead, Vice President Dick Cheney 
made an appearance on “The Rush Limbaugh 
Show” to promote the immigration plan. The 
White House was aiming at the heart of the 
opposition within its own ranks and was using the 
forum most likely to communicate with credibility. 
Limbaugh was hardly a new phenomenon; he had 
been a powerful influence within the Republican 
Party for more than a decade. But during the 
immigration debates of 2006 and 2007, key forms 
of alternative media—talk radio, ethnic media, 
partisan television and the blogosphere—played 
an outsized role. During those crucial days in May 
2006 when Congress was debating the nation’s 
demographic destiny, President Bush used the 
most bully of all pulpits to make his case—an Oval 
Office address in prime time—knowing that the 
verdict would be rendered on AM radios in the 
middle of the day, through high-decibel punditry 
on dinner hour television and in late-night 
computer postings. And, it would all happen again, 
following the same script, almost exactly a year 
later during the 2007 debate. 
The immigration debates of 2006 and 2007 starkly 
illuminate the rising influence of new media in 
federal policy deliberations, and the lessons learned 
are potentially applicable to other areas of policy as 
well. Talk radio, partisan cable TV and Internet 
punditry undoubtedly played a far greater role in 
this round of policymaking than in any previous 
immigration debate, and so this episode serves as 
valuable case study. It is historically convenient 
because the points of contrast are 10 and 20 years 
in the past, across technological horizons. And, 
while the media had changed, the public policy 
issues had not. The dilemmas facing policymakers 
were roughly the same as they had been in 1986 
and 1996, albeit on a much larger scale. In 1986, 
for example, with newspapers and the broadcast 
networks as unchallenged sources of news, 
Washington wrestled with the terms of a legalization 
program for a population of about 5 million 
unauthorized migrants. Twenty years later, with 
the new forms of media exercising new kinds of 
influence, Washington debated another legalization 
program, this time with a target population of 
12 million. 
… during the immigration debates of 2006  
and 2007, key forms of alternative media—talk 
radio, ethnic media, partisan television and the  
blogosphere—played an outsized role.
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The recent immigration debates are also a ripe 
specimen because the political context accentuated 
the power of noninstitutional political players. 
Like so much else in Washington, immigration 
policy has been subject to aggressive intervention 
by a variety of interest groups with divergent aims. 
But on immigration, and much else, competing 
interests traditionally were mediated by institutional 
players in the executive and legislative branches 
and very often these competitions were resolved 
behind closed doors. During the immigration 
debates of 2006 and 2007, the institutional players 
were in a weakened condition, thus creating 
greater opportunities for some of the new players 
emerging on the media landscape. 
The political figure most obviously in a diminished 
state was President Bush himself. Between the 
time of his East Room speech on immigration in 
January 2004 and the Oval Office address in May 
2006, Bush’s job approval ratings had dropped from 
58 percent to 33 percent in Pew Research Center 
polls.  There were many reasons for this decline. 
But even when he was a popular president, Bush 
had never been in a strong political position on 
immigration. Many Democrats and immigrants 
rights advocates attacked his 2004 proposal because 
it lacked a path to citizenship for unauthorized 
migrants. Moderate Republicans were largely 
indifferent to it, and conservatives decried it: The 
cover of the National Review rendered a simple 
judgment: “Amnesty, Again.” In the midst of a 
re-election campaign, Bush could not risk alienat-
ing his base. The administration never proposed 
any specific legislation, never mounted a lobbying 
effort behind the plan. By spring, the temporary 
worker proposal was a dead letter. 
When the second term began in 2005, Bush 
made an overhaul of Social Security his top 
domestic priority and utterly failed. The White 
House then took aim at immigration in the 
summer of 2005, developing a proposal for a 
comprehensive bill and extensively briefing major 
players on its provisions. The goal was to launch a 
bipartisan legislative initiative shortly after Labor 
Day so a bill could be enacted before the end of 
the year. Events intervened, however. At the end of 
August, Hurricane Katrina produced a spectacle of 
death and destruction on the Gulf Coast and, with 
them, a lasting impression of government inepti-
tude. A few days later, William H. Rehnquist, chief 
justice of the United States, died at his home, 
setting off a nomination scramble over two slots 
because Justice Sandra Day O’Connor had earlier 
announced her retirement. Bush eventually 
nominated Harriet Miers, his personal lawyer and 
the White House counsel, to O’Connor’s seat, but 
the nomination was rejected by the conservative 
wing of his own party. Meanwhile, the investigation 
over who leaked the identity of a covert CIA 
operative was reaching into the White House.
Congress, too, had a diminished capacity to control 
the policy debate on immigration. Republicans 
were riven by ideological infighting with the White 
House and a perceived political need to separate from 
a weakened lame-duck president as the off-year 
election approached. Moreover, a leadership 
transition was under way after the indictment in 
September 2005 of House Majority Leader Tom 
DeLay on campaign finance charges; “The Hammer” 
had been the party’s disciplinarian in the chamber. 
Among congressional Democrats, meanwhile,  
caution was the watchword. The Democrats still 
ached over their party’s narrow loss in the 2004 
presidential election and looked forward to the 
2006 vote as a chance for vindication. After they 
took control of both houses in that election, 
Democratic leaders had another worry: House 
freshmen from swing districts had to be protected 
from unpredictable controversies like immigration.  
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NEw MEDIa vOICES  
aND THE fIRST STalEMaTE
Weakness in Washington opened a space for other 
political actors to define policy choices, and potent 
voices in the media began driving the immigration 
agenda among conservatives. As Bush began his 
second term, Rush Limbaugh, the self-appointed 
guardian of the conservative movement and host 
of the most popular show on talk radio, warned 
that immigration had the potential to split fatally the 
Republican Party. Like many other commentators 
on the right, Limbaugh did not attack Bush 
directly, even as the president tried to revive his 
temporary worker plan; instead, Limbaugh 
emphasized the need to secure the borders. A week 
after the inauguration, for example, Bill O’Reilly, 
the Fox News commentator, decried the “border 
chaos,” threats to national sovereignty and identity 
posed by Mexican immigration, and the dangers of 
terrorist infiltration from the south. All were familiar 
themes to his viewers, but he essentially excused 
Bush for not taking action. “Well, you know, it’s so 
politically charged that the Bush administration 
certainly is not going to do it, even though they’ve 
been re-elected,” he said, “because … the future of 
the Republican Party, according to their strategists, 
lies with Hispanic-Americans, and what they’re doing.”
As 2005 passed, stances toughened. In April, 
Limbaugh repeatedly praised a demonstration by 
the Minuteman Project and by August he was 
warning congressional Republicans that they 
would suffer politically if they did not take action 
on immigration enforcement. By October, Dobbs 
was criticizing Bush for, “21 months of silence on 
the issue of immigration reform,” and chastising 
the Republican-led Congress for not taking up the 
issue. It was, he said, “a do-nothing Congress on 
the issues that really matter most to middle-class 
Americans.” At the end of November, Bush took a 
two-day trip to Arizona and Texas in which he 
promised more border enforcement, but O’Reilly 
painted the visit as a political effort to shore up his 
standing with conservatives and questioned his 
commitment to get tough. “The president has been 
intimidated by the far left,” he said. And casting a 
wider net, O’Reilly declared, “You’re going to have to 
take very drastic action against poor, pitiful people 
to stop this [illegal immigration]. And no politician 
in the country at this point is willing to do so.”
House Republicans heard the message coming 
from conservative media and rushed through an 
immigration bill composed exclusively of enforce-
ment measures just before they adjourned in the 
final days of 2005. The bill called for building 698 
miles of additional border fencing at a cost of $3.2 
million a mile. It also would have broadly authorized 
local law enforcement officers to enforce immigration 
laws and get federal pay for doing it. Employers 
would be required to verify the immigration status 
of all workers, but bowing to pressure from business 
lobbies the bill did not require full enforcement of 
this provision for six years. The most controversial 
aspect of the legislation would have made it a 
felony to be in the country illegally and would 
have criminalized giving any assistance to an 
unauthorized migrant—even a meal from a soup 
kitchen. The author of the bill, House Judiciary 
Committee Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner, a 
Republican of Wisconsin, belatedly realized the 
enormous costs to the criminal justice system of  
providing jury trials for illegal migrants who are 
easily deported under existing law. He tried to 
remove the criminalization provision with a floor 
amendment but was blocked by Democrats who 
saw this outlandish feature as a poison pill that 
might eventually kill the bill.1 What the Democrats 
had no way of foreseeing was just how provocative 
criminalization would be for the nation’s immigrants 
and their allies. 
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On March 10, 2006, a crowd estimated variously 
between 100,000 and 300,000 people marched 
through the streets of downtown Chicago to 
protest the House immigration bill. Latino 
immigrants, their U.S.-born children, labor unions, 
church groups and immigrants’ rights advocates 
massed together and demanded that the legislation 
be defeated. “We are not criminals!” marchers 
incensed by the bill’s criminalization provision 
chanted repeatedly. And their accompanying 
threat—“Today we march, tomorrow we vote”—
was aimed not only at Republicans but also at any 
Democrats who might want to avoid tackling the 
immigration issue. By May 1, similar scenes had 
been repeated in more than 120 U.S. cities with 
protests that involved more than 3.5 million 
people, according to estimates by the Mexico 
Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars.2 
The marches represented not only one of the largest 
civic mobilizations in American history but also 
one of the least structured and most spontaneous, 
having been coordinated only loosely on a national 
level and having involved a variety of ad hoc 
coalitions in individual cities. The most powerful 
evidence for the spontaneity and lack of structure 
is that after the spring of 2006, several efforts to 
organize other marches failed to produce substantial 
crowds. No clearly identifiable leaders, organizations 
or political agendas emerged from all that activity. 
However, one enduring and growing institution 
played a central role in the immigrant marches: 
the Spanish-language media. The national television 
networks Univision and Telemundo, as well as 
dozens of local affiliates and hundreds of radio 
stations, promoted the marches and even offered 
explicit instructions to participants on how to 
behave. White T-shirts were the dress of choice, 
and U.S. flags were far preferable to those of the 
home country. In Los Angeles, for example, three 
hugely popular radio hosts, Eddie “El Piolin” 
(Tweety Bird) Sotelo, Ricardo “El Mandril”  
(The Baboon) Sanchez, and Renan “El Cucuy” 
(The Boogeyman) Almendarez Coello, set aside 
rivalries and their penchant for raucous, often 
off-color humor to join forces behind the protests. 
They appeared together on the steps of City Hall 
to announce the date of the march, conducted 
repeated on-air interviews with organizers and 
then marched at the head of a crowd that stretched 
for 20 blocks. 
Just as conservative media powers outside of 
traditional journalism helped propel restrictionist 
legislation, the equally untraditional ethnic media 
helped block it. 
Several major immigration bills had been introduced 
in the Senate in 2005, but serious maneuvering did 
not get under way until just after the immigrant 
marches began. As Washington was immersed in 
weeks of negotiations and debate, the protests 
gathered momentum around the country. Though 
many political factors were at play, the marches 
kept attention focused on the issue and kept up the 
pressure on Democrats to block the Sensenbrenner 
bill. In the midst of the debate, Sen. Edward M. 
Kennedy, the Massachusetts Democrat who was 
co-author of one of the major bills with Sen. John 
McCain, the Arizona Republican, addressed 
marchers who had filled the National Mall to 
assure them he would not back down. Weeks later, 
on May 25, 2006, a bipartisan coalition of 23 
Republicans, 38 Democrats and one independent 
passed a comprehensive immigration bill through 
… one enduring and growing institution played 
a central role in the immigrant marches: 
the Spanish-language media.
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the Senate. It included a legalization program that 
would cover most undocumented migrants, a 
temporary worker program and a series of 
enforcement measures. The ultimate fate of these 
provisions was uncertain because Republicans, 
who then controlled both houses of Congress, 
would dominate the conference committee where 
differences between the Senate and the House bills 
were to be reconciled. 
The Latino radio hosts had countered the conser-
vative talkers. The Senate had countered the House. 
In both realms, however, there was more rhetoric 
than reality. The day after the Senate passed its bill, 
Sensenbrenner rejected its key provisions. “The 
president is not where the American people are at,” 
he said at a news conference. Echoing the conserva-
tive media, he said the Senate’s legalization plan 
amounted to “amnesty,” and he predicted—correctly, 
as it turned out—that the House would never 
consider it. No conference committee ever attempted 
to work out the difference between the Senate and 
the House bills, and both eventually died. The House 
had said “no” to Bush, and then the Senate said “no” 
to the House. The result was a stalemate until the 
November 2006 elections produced a new Congress 
with fragile Democratic majorities in both houses. 
That set the stage for the next round of the debate. 
STOKINg aNxIETy  
aND DEfININg THE DEbaTE
As discussed in E.J. Dionne’s accompanying essay on 
public attitudes toward immigration (See “Migrating 
Attitudes, Shifting Opinions: The Role of Public 
Opinion in the Immigration Debate”) anxiety over 
illegal immigration increased during the Bush 
presidency much more among conservatives than 
among liberals or moderates. A March 2001, Gallup 
Poll found that 31 percent of conservatives said 
they worried a great deal about illegal immigration; 
by March 2005, it was up to 41 percent. This anxiety 
among conservatives continued to mount steadily, 
rising to 51 percent in 2006 and 54 percent in 2007, 
as Washington focused intensely on the subject. 
Anxieties among moderates increased as well, 
though less dramatically, from 27 percent who said 
illegal immigration caused them a great deal of 
worry in 2001 to 45 percent in 2007. Opinion among 
liberals changed less over the same period, with the 
share expressing a great deal of worry increasing 
from 23 percent in 2001 to 31 percent in 2007. 
The nature of that anxiety, however, is fairly well 
focused. For most Americans, any problems with 
immigration lie with the policy, not the phenomenon. 
Their unhappiness is directed more toward 
government than toward immigrants. Consider 
that in a CBS-New York Times survey taken in 
May 2007, 49 percent of respondents said the 
immigration system needed to be completely 
rebuilt and 41 percent said it needed fundamental 
change3—that’s 90 percent favoring significant 
change. But in the same survey, most respondents 
held positive views of immigrants: 57 percent 
agreed that “most recent immigrants contribute to 
this country,” compared with 28 percent who said 
they “cause problems.” 
When it comes to the options for changing the 
immigration system, public opinion surveys 
consistently show support for a combination of 
policies, in effect, a grand bargain. The May 2007 
CBS–New York Times survey found that 62 percent 
of Americans favored a legalization program that 
would allow illegal immigrants living in the country 
… anxiety over illegal immigration increased  
during the Bush presidency much more among  
conservatives than among liberals or moderates.
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for two years to keep their jobs and apply for legal 
status, while 33 percent said such people should be 
deported. Opinion split by a similar measure in favor 
of a temporary worker program. At the same time, 
three-quarters (75 percent) of the respondents 
favored increasing enforcement on employers and 
raising fines against those who hire unauthorized 
migrants. Given a choice, two-thirds (68 percent) 
said that increasing the Border Patrol would be the 
most effective means to control illegal crossings, 
while 15 percent favored more fences instead. (The 
only immigration control legislation actually enacted 
during the debates of 2006 and 2007 called for 
building more fences and little else.)
Dionne’s analysis shows that talk radio may have 
been a potent influence in strengthening resistance 
to legalization measures among conservative 
Republicans. This apparent influence from the 
new media landscape extended beyond simply 
underscoring the importance of immigration 
controls; it also encompassed the framing of the 
issue and the terms with which it was discussed. 
Moreover, the radio and cable TV hosts and the 
bloggers on the right helped boost organizations 
that promoted an agenda of more enforcement 
and less immigration by giving frequent favorable 
exposure to the leaders of such groups as Numbers 
USA, the Minuteman Project, the Federation for 
American Immigration Reform and the Center for 
Immigration Studies. These organizations, particu-
larly Numbers USA, then mobilized their members 
to bombard Congress with faxes, e-mails and letters. 
Thus the conservative commentators and the 
pro-restriction groups created a highly effective 
echo chamber that reverberated on Capitol Hill.
The use of the term “amnesty” to describe a proposal 
that would grant any kind of legal status under any 
conditions to any individual who had entered the 
country illegally is perhaps the single most obvious 
and successful tactic of pro-restriction advocates 
and their allies in the media in defining the terms of 
the debate. As noted above, the term was invoked 
as soon as Bush proposed his temporary worker 
program in 2004, even though the plan would have 
allowed only a limited number of unauthorized 
migrants to remain for a limited period of years 
and only so long as they were employed in jobs left 
unfilled by native workers. “Amnesty” was also 
wielded to brand the far different proposal in the 
final Senate debate of 2007 that would have provided 
a path to citizenship for unauthorized migrants of 
long tenure in the United States who met a number 
of conditions including payment of a fine for 
having violated the law on entering the country. 
For example, during the months of May and June 
2007, at the height of the Senate debate on 
immigration, “Lou Dobbs Tonight” on CNN 
featured 42 lengthy stories on immigration, 
hammering the subject every day the show was 
broadcast. The term “amnesty” was used in every 
story. Over at “The O’Reilly Factor” on the Fox News 
Network, “amnesty” was applied to the Senate 
legislation on 18 of 34 stories about immigration 
broadcast during those critical months.
Bush and other proponents of a comprehensive 
bill were left to plead that their proposals did not 
amount to amnesty. In his Oval Office address to 
the nation, Bush said, “Some in this country argue 
that the solution is to deport every illegal immigrant, 
and that any proposal short of this amounts to 
amnesty. I disagree.” He tried to convince the 
public that the Senate bill had struck “a rational 
… radio and cable TV hosts and the bloggers 
on the right helped boost organizations 
that promoted an agenda of more enforcement 
and less immigration.
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middle ground” between mass deportation and 
blanket amnesty. But for those Americans, primarily 
conservatives, whose opinions had been formed 
by the pro-restriction voices of the new media, 
Bush was posing a false distinction. It was also a 
losing proposition. 
A UPI-Zogby Poll taken during the 2007 Senate 
debate found that 65 percent of respondents 
agreed that the legislation under discussion—a 
version of Bush’s middle ground—“represents 
amnesty for illegal immigrants.” 4 Mississippi 
Republican Sen. Trent Lott said of the 2007 bill as 
it was headed for defeat: “Talk radio defined it 
without us explaining that there were reasons for 
it, and the good things that were in it.”  Another 
Republican who supported the 2007 legislation, 
Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina was even 
more pointed in describing how harsh voices in 
the media and elsewhere set the terms for the 
policy discussion, “there’s racism in this debate,’’ 
he said. “Nobody likes to talk about it, but a very 
small percentage of people involved in this debate 
really have racial and bigoted remarks. The tone 
that we create around these debates, whether it be 
rhetoric in a union hall or rhetoric on talk radio, 
it can take people who are on the fence and push 
them over emotionally.’’
The power of defining the legislation in these 
terms was evident in a Pew Research Center 
survey taken about the same time.5 Among 
Republicans, a solid majority of 62 percent said 
they would favor dealing with illegal immigrants 
already in the country by “providing a way to gain 
legal citizenship” if they met certain conditions 
such as passing a background check, paying a fine 
and having a job—essentially what the Senate 
legislation proposed. When the policy was 
described under the same conditions but using 
the term “amnesty,” only 47 percent of Republicans 
said they favored it. Nonetheless, it is important to 
underscore that even with the amnesty language, 
Republicans were split evenly with 48 percent 
saying they opposed the idea. Moreover, among 
the public as a whole, clear majorities favored 
legalization regardless of how it was described, 
with 63 percent supporting a path to citizenship 
and 54 percent supporting the amnesty formula-
tion. Allowing conservative commentators to 
define the issue was a significant tactical setback 
for proponents of comprehensive immigration 
reform, though the reasons for their ultimate 
failure were more complex. 
STalEMaTE, aCT II
After the Democratic victories in the November 
2006 elections, quiet work got under way in 
Washington to revive comprehensive immigration 
reform by forging yet another grand bargain. By 
early spring 2007, intensive talks were taking place 
on detailed provisions. Kennedy and Sen. Jon Kyl 
(R-Ariz.) led a bipartisan group of legislators who 
often met on a daily basis with Commerce 
Secretary Carlos Gutierrez and Homeland Security 
Secretary Michael Chertoff. The political strategy, 
conceived largely by Kennedy, was to negotiate 
behind closed doors, free from the influence of 
the media. Then, once a deal had been reached 
by senators representing a broad spectrum of 
opinion, the bill would be taken directly to the 
Senate floor without hearings or a campaign of 
public persuasion. Kennedy hoped to minimize 
debate and amendments so as to produce a 
quick vote for enactment before outside forces 
could interfere.
On May 17, a Thursday, Kennedy, Kyl and their 
allies unveiled what would have been the most 
massive reform of immigration policy in more than 
two decades. It not only addressed all the pending 
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issues involved with unauthorized migration—
guest workers, legalization and increased enforce-
ment—but also proposed a profound change in the 
legal immigration system, introducing a “merit-
based” system that would weigh potential residents 
according to their economic utility. The plan was 
to begin debate the following Monday and have a 
vote on passage before the Memorial Day recess at 
the end of the week. 
The bill’s authors confessed its limitations as they 
presented it at a news conference. Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein, the California Democrat, pleaded with 
her colleagues, “Please, please, please don’t let …
the perfect be the enemy of the good.” And, 
Kennedy, still confident that he could harness the 
Senate to compromise as in years past, said, 
“politics is the art of the possible and the agree-
ment we just reached is the best possible chance 
we will have in years to secure our borders [and] 
bring millions of people out of the shadows and 
into the sunshine of America.” But, Kennedy also 
knew that the politics of immigration as they had 
evolved in a new media environment required him 
to move quickly. 
Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), an opponent of the 
legislation, said Kennedy and his allies wanted to 
get the legislation passed, “before Rush Limbaugh 
could tell the American people what was in it.” 
As noted above, Limbaugh and others in the 
conservative talk media launched an unprecedented 
campaign to tell their audiences what they thought 
was in the bill and to rally opposition to it. Some 
of the figures from the Project for Excellence in 
Journalism report bear repeating: while the Senate 
debate was under way, Dobbs devoted 43.1 percent 
of his broadcasts to immigration, O’Reilly gave 
the topic 19.4 percent, and for conservative talk 
radio hosts it was 31 percent of their airtime in 
a relentlessly negative portrayal of the bill as a 
reward to lawbreakers, and the corporate interests 
that thrive on cheap imported labor and elites bent 
on changing the nation’s identity.
Just ten days into the debate, Bush tried to respond 
to the media voices that had once been among his 
most loyal supporters. ‘’If you want to scare the 
American people, what you say is the bill’s an 
amnesty bill,’’ he said May 29 during a speech in 
Glynco, GA. “That’s empty political rhetoric trying 
to frighten our citizens.’’  But it was already  
too late.
The quick-vote strategy fell apart almost immedi-
ately as it became apparent that the doubters in the 
Senate were as numerous as the bill’s provisions. 
The major attacks came from pro-labor Democrats 
who opposed the temporary worker program and 
from pro-restriction Republicans who immediately 
raised the specter of “amnesty.” Amendments 
proliferated, and advocates from every sector 
entered the fray. Restaurant owners, agricultural 
producers, high-tech businesses, unions, churches 
and ethnic advocates all pounded the Senate with 
pleas for their particular interests. Comprehensive 
reform failed on one vote June 7, and then 
staggered back to life a week later. In between, 
some provisions were altered in an effort to make 
the package palatable to conservatives, but the 
changes failed in that regard and caused further 
unease among some Democrats and immigrant 
rights advocates. On June 28 a motion to end 
debate was 14 votes short of the 60 necessary to 
move toward final passage, and the bill was dead. 
In the end, 15 Democrats joined 37 Republicans 
and one independent in killing it. 
The grand bargain of 2007—so carefully crafted 
in private—died a death of a thousand cuts when 
it was debated in public. In trying to address 
virtually all aspects of immigration policy, it 
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became not a single defining compromise but a 
stack of compromises that had too many cross-
cutting dynamics. Individual legislators and 
advocates found themselves trying to fix one or 
two provisions even as they tried to defend one or 
two others from alteration. Preventing the debate 
from devolving into running skirmishes over 
details would have required strong leadership in 
Washington. But Kennedy failed to hold key 
unions, especially the AFL-CIO, which opposed 
the temporary worker provisions, and Bush failed 
to hold key Republican moderates. 
The battle for public opinion, however, was entirely 
one-sided. While the conservative talkers and 
bloggers roared, liberal commentators showed 
little appetite for the subject. Moreover, powerful 
interest groups that supported comprehensive 
reform, such as the major business associations 
and the Catholic bishops, largely confined them-
selves to Washington lobbying rather than 
aggressively promoting their own messages to 
counter Limbaugh, Dobbs and the others. The 
media blitz by the anti-amnesty, pro-restriction 
voices did not succeed in persuading a majority 
of Americans to embrace their views. As Dionne’s 
analysis demonstrates, most Americans have 
consistently favored both tougher enforcement 
and some kind of legalization program for 
unauthorized migrants already in the country. 
In addition, most Americans express generally 
favorable views toward immigrants and reject the 
xenophobia that sometimes surfaced among 
opponents of comprehensive reform. But in 2007, 
the strident voices of opposition were not trying 
to enact legislation; they were trying to block it, 
and in that they succeeded. 
With the passage of the House bill in December 
2005, the forces of restriction took the initiative 
and then they were stopped in the spring of 2006. 
A year later, proponents of generous immigration 
policies took the initiative, and then they were 
stymied. Both cases represented a triumph of 
“no” that resulted in stalemate. Although the 
circumstances differed significantly, common 
themes could be traced back to the way the media 
have covered immigration. One of those themes 
was articulated, albeit somewhat histrionically, 
by Sen. Jim DeMint (R-S.C.), a diehard opponent 
of comprehensive reform, in the closing hours 
of the 2007 debate: “This immigration bill has 
become a war between the American people and 
their government. The issue now transcends 
anything related to immigration. It’s a crisis 
of confidence.” 
Over the course of three decades, successive 
administrations and successive Congresses 
have failed to deliver on promises to control 
the border and to maintain a fair and orderly 
immigration system. So a certain lack of confi-
dence on the part of the American people is 
justified. But getting past that skepticism to enact 
new policies that can remedy the situation has 
been made more difficult by a media narrative 
that episodically creates a sense of crisis that 
emphasizes illegality as the dominant characteristic 
of the migration story and that casts the public as 
hapless victims of immigrant newcomers, policy-
makers and advocates. Add to that narrative the 
new forms of media that have the capacity to 
mobilize niche audiences in opposition to policy 
proposals that are characterized in the direst 
terms. Stalemate would seem to be the inevitable 
outcome unless political leaders are first able to 
While the conservative talkers and bloggers  
roared, liberal commentators showed  
little appetite for the subject.
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regain credibility on immigration and to restore, 
or at least to begin to restore, that lost confidence. 
This is the dilemma that will confront the new 
administration and the new Congress when they 
tackle immigration. They should not expect any 
help from the media in any of its forms. 
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NOTE ON METHODOlOgy 
 
uSC-aNNENbERg CONTENT aNalySIS— 
TRaDITIONal NEwS ORgaNIzaTIONS
This study employed content analysis to identify 
how immigration and immigration policy were 
framed in the U.S. news media between 1980 and 
2007, and if the framing of these subjects changed 
over time. News media considered in the analysis 
included newspapers, news agencies, National Public 
Radio and the three national broadcast networks.  
A full listing of the news organizations and the 
periods for which they were studied is below. 
The LexisNexis Academic Universe database served 
as the source for all of the analyses. The full body 
of coverage by individual news organizations over 
specific periods was searched using different 
combinations of search terms to generate the fullest 
possible sample of stories that primarily dealt with 
the subject of immigration. For example, the sample 
of coverage by The New York Times was selected 
based on a search specifying that the term “immigra-
tion” appeared at least five times in a search of the 
headline, the text of the article and the indexing of 
the subject matter by LexisNexis. Further filters were 
applied to limit the kind of publication. For example, 
coverage by the Associated Press was limited to 
stories published in the AM cycle only.  
Stories from all news organizations were examined in 
the analysis of the volume of immigration coverage. 
All stories from The New York Times, the Associated 
Press, USA Today, the CBS Evening News and the 
three television broadcast networks’ evening news 
shows in 2006 and 2007 were further analyzed in 
detail to determine whether illegality was the frame 
of the story.  Each story was filtered to determine 
whether the dateline was from the U.S. and if not 
whether it related directly to immigration to the 
U.S. Stories were individually examined and coded 
to determine whether the primary focus fell into 
the category of illegality according to the following 
criteria: The major topic of the story related to 
unauthorized entry into the United States by 
persons from abroad, government efforts to 
control unauthorized entries, crimes alleged to 
have been committed by foreign-born persons or 
by immigration officials, or the activities of illegal 
migrants in the United States. In the case of large 
samples drawn from regional newspapers and 
news services automated searches utilizing 
keywords and NexisLexis indexing terms were 
used to determine whether stories were coded as 
having a framework of illegality. 
Subsamples drawn over limited time periods were 
further coded to determine whether a specific 
subject was involved such as the Elián González 
saga during 1999 and 2000. Articles published by a 
selection of news organizations in 2006 and 2007 
with an illegality frame were further coded for the 
use of one of the following illegality “sub-frames”: 
policy development by the executive branch, 
Congress, or the courts; federal policy implemen-
tation; state and local policy development and 
implementation; pro-, anti-, or mixed public opinion; 
electoral politics; and migrant experiences. Additional 
analysis was conducted on coverage by the 
broadcast networks to categorize the persons quoted.
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In addition, the coverage of several specific 
episodes such as the Minuteman Project protests in 
Arizona in 2005 and policy-making on immigration 
by local governments in Northern Virginia from 
2004 to 2007 were examined by drawing samples 
from selected news organizations and by searching 
with terms related to the specific stories in question. 
uSC-aNNENbERg CONTENT aNalySIS— 
POlITICal blOgS
The data for this analysis came from all blog posts 
made in the six month period between February 1, 
2007 to July 31, 2007 on five, well-known political 
blogs: Daily Kos, Instapundit, Michelle Malkin, 
Powerline, and Talking Points Memo.  The blogs were 
selected according to three criteria: They are among 
the most popular political blogs. The primary posts 
are generated by a single author or a specific group 
of authors. Together the five represent the spectrum 
of public opinion. A total of 13,769 posts were 
examined and of these 545 were identified as 
discussing issues relating to immigration.
First, a word search was conducted for each post to 
determine whether the words “immigration” or 
“immigrant” appeared in the post.  If the words 
did appear, the number of times they occurred in 
the post was recorded.  Post length (number or 
words), time, author, and title were also recorded. 
Once a post had been identified as containing the 
words “immigration” and/or “immigrant”, it was 
more closely examined to see whether immigra-
tion was a central topic of the post of just a passing 
reference.  If one of the terms appeared in the title 
or first paragraph of the post it was automatically 
coded as an “immigration post”.  If the terms did 
not appear in the title or first paragraph, the post 
was more closely examined to determine whether 
or not immigration was a key theme. Examples 
of posts that were not coded as pertaining to 
immigration are posts where the term immigration 
NEWS ORgANIZATION
PERIOD 
ExAMINED
ELIgIbLE SAMPLE 
SIZE
FILTERS
The New York Times 1980-2007 2,859 National Desk
Associated Press 1980-2007 1,939* AM Cycle
Regional Papers: 1991-2007 6,370 Atlanta Journal Constitution, boston globe, St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle
News Services: 1997-2007 3,760 Copley, Cox, McClatchy
USA Today 1992-2007 715
CbS News 1990-2007 381 CbS Evening News
National broadcast Networks: 
CbS, NbC, AbC
2006-2007 201 Evening news broadcasts
National Public Radio: 1992-2007 1,288 Morning Edition and All Things Considered
*  because of the large volume of content drawn from the Associated Press, a sample was constructed by randomly selecting 25% of the articles, or 1,939, 
from the total population of 7,757.
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was used as a descriptor with no further elaboration 
of the term (i.e. John Smith, an immigration 
lawyer….) or references to immigration policy in 
countries other than the United States. However, 
the majority of posts containing the words 
“immigration” or “immigrant” were coded as 
“immigration posts.”  A total of 571 posts contained 
the terms “immigration” or “immigrant” and of 
these 545 were coded as “immigration posts.” 
DAILY KOS 
(LIbERAL)
TALKINg POINTS 
MEMO (LIbERAL)
INSTAPUNDIT 
(LIbERTARIAN)
MIChELLE MALKIN 
(CONSERvATIvE)
POWERLINE 
(CONSERvATIvE)
Total Sample 2594 2799 5547 1132 1697
Immigration Posts 109 55 101 176 104
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As comprehensive news coverage of 2007 from the 
Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in 
Journalism (PEJ) shows, the war and the presiden-
tial election consumed nearly a third of the overall 
newshole.1 And the debate over U.S. immigration 
policy was able to secure itself a position within the 
top 10 stories of the year. It was the fourth biggest 
story overall for 2007.
However, a closer look into the data shows that 
immigration coverage for the year 2007 was not 
consistent, but episodic. Analysis of a year in the 
news of immigration comes from PEJ’s in-depth 
analysis of news coverage of 70,737 stories for the 
entire year of 48 media outlets across 5 media 
sectors. Below are some of the key findings specific 
to immigration:
n   American media did not cover immigration as a 
topic continuously. “Media’s tendency to flood 
the zone with instant coverage and then quickly 
drop the subject,” as stated in PEJ’s State of the 
News Media 2008 report, was also seen in 
immigration coverage. An overall look into all 
media sectors shows that immigration as a 
topic2 in the first four months of the year was 
below 2%. A sudden surge came in May and 
June in which the numbers for immigration 
jumped to 6.1% and 7.6% respectively. And then 
for the rest of the year it went back to the 2–3% 
range. The surge in immigration coverage 
coincided with the May 17 announcement of 
the compromise bill among the Senate and the 
White House and its defeat on June 28. 
n    Talk hosts both in cable and radio sectors played a 
major role in the media’s coverage of the 
immigration bill. For the period of May 17 –  
June 28, immigration policy coverage was highest 
among conservative radio talk hosts and cable 
TV talk hosts, with 31% and 18.5% respectively. 
Some argue that the nation’s talk hosts had an 
important role in the demise of the immigration 
bill. As stated in our earlier weekly index reports 
“it’s impossible to document how many votes 
they changed or how many calls and emails 
they inspired, but derailing the bill certainly 
was a major priority of such conservative hosts 
as Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity and Michael 
Savage.” This also showed how immigration as a 
subject became more political in nature. 
n    A look into the breakdown of immigration 
stories in 2007 reiterates the political character 
of coverage. Fully 54.2% of the newshole of all 
immigration stories considered in this study 
were on legislation discussion. The second 
largest category (27% of the news space studied) 
In a year dominated by the war in Iraq and the 2008 presidential campaign coverage, how much 
media attention did immigration receive? Which aspects of the immigration issue did the media 
most tune into? What was not covered? And who provided the most coverage?
NEwS COvERagE Of IMMIgRaTION 2007
a political story, not an issue, covered episodically 
baNu aKDENIzlI
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was a miscellany of events: such as Immigrations 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids on illegal 
immigrants, and a variety of human interest 
stories, including one about Elvira Arellano, 
who took refuge in a church in Chicago. 
n    With the growing Latino population in the U.S., 
some forecast that immigration will become a 
larger part of presidential campaign debates. 
But in 2007, during which most of the presi-
dential election coverage was dominated by 
horserace politics, immigration received only 
minimal coverage within the campaign. Out of 
5,657 presidential campaign stories, only 75 of 
them related to immigration.
n    As stated in PEJ’s State of the News Media 2008 
report, overall, newspapers and network 
television—when compared to the more 
opinionated platforms of talk radio and cable 
television news—have a broader and more 
diverse news agenda. This was evident in the 
case of immigration coverage as well. While 
immigration policy coverage skyrocketed in 
May and June for talk radio and cable, immi-
gration as a topic was consistently present 
within newspapers signaling an effort to track 
immigration as a subject that ebbed and flowed 
throughout the year.
Throughout 2007, the news agenda was dominated 
by a few major general topic areas. As stated in the 
State of the News Media 2008 report by PEJ, 
“coverage of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. politics 
and elections accounted for almost one-third of 
the overall newshole for the year.” Immigration as 
a topic came in after business coverage at 2.8% of 
the overall newshole.
A closer look into the immigration coverage 
timeline across the year and media reveals how, as 
a topic, it was not only covered episodically but 
also in political terms. While coverage was pretty 
much low but steady throughout the year, the spike 
to 5.2% for the second quarter of 2007 shows how 
immigration as a topic received more coverage 
when it was political.
As illustrated in Chart Two, the year in the news 
was dominated by two continuing story lines, 
the presidential election and the Iraq war, they 
dominated nearly a third of the overall newshole 
in PEJ’s analysis of news media.  Immigration as a 
top story was at number four with 2.9 %. Yet this 
number is a bit misleading.
A month by month look into the trajectory of 
immigration as a big story revealed that coverage 
was marked by episodic spikes, rather than being 
continuous. A jump in May to 5.3% and in June to 
8.4% of the overall newshole for all media demon-
strated once again that immigration was not 
covered as a topic but primarily a politicized 
subject. The breakdown of the immigration big 
story also illustrates how coverage mostly centered 
around the discussion of legislation.
Jan – Mar
Apr – Jun
Jul – Sep
Oct – Dec
Percent of newshole
1.4
1.8
2.7
5.2
Source: PEJ, A Year in the News 2007. 
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While immigration received modest media 
attention in the first three months of 2007, it 
emerged in the second quarter of the year to 
become the biggest domestic policy issue. The 
debate over U.S. immigration policy, which 
included an unsuccessful effort to pass a major 
immigration reform bill in the Senate, was the 
fourth biggest story overall in the quarter, filling 
5.7% of the total newshole.
Coverage of immigration during that time increased 
dramatically in every sector. More specifically, 
coverage increased sharply between May 17 and 
June 28 coinciding with the time frame of the birth 
and death of the immigration bill. Coverage of 
immigration across all media was the number one 
topic in the news. With 9.2% of the news space 
studied for that particular time period, immigra-
tion was able to secure first place ahead of the 
presidential campaign coverage at 8.9%.  Let us 
consider this specific time period in more detail.
IMMIgRaTION bIll COvERagE
On June 24, the Associated Press ran an article 
titled “Talk Shows’ Sway on Immigration Rises,” 
arguing how national talk show hosts have spent 
months denouncing the bill as providing amnesty 
for illegal immigrants. The New York Times and 
The Washington Post ran similar articles highlight-
ing how talk radio personalities “put the issue on 
the front burner.”
One of our Talk Index reports spotlighting 
immigration summarizes the timeline of the 
immigration bill in the following way:
On May 17, the Senate and the White House 
announced a compromise agreement on a 
wide-ranging bill attempting to deal with the 
nation’s troubled immigration system. The measure 
was backed by the President and some senators, 
mostly Democrats, but generated opposition from 
both the right and the left. Forty-two days later, on 
June 28, the legislation died in the Senate despite 
an energetic White House effort to save it.
As mentioned previously, during this time 
immigration was the top story followed closely by 
the presidential campaign coverage across all 
media. This was also the case in individual sectors. 
Coverage of immigration increased dramatically, 
finishing as the top story in newspapers (8%); at 
2008 
Campaign
Iraq Policy
Events
in Iraq
Immigration
Iran
Domestic
Terrorism
U.S. 
Economy
Iraq 
Homefront
Pakistan
Fired U.S. 
Attorneys
Percent of newshole
5.9
2.9
2.4
2.0
1.9
1.8
1.6
1.5
7.8
10.8
Source:  PEJ, A Year in the News 2007. 
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fourth place online (4.2%); the third biggest 
network story (6.1%); the second biggest cable 
story (11.9%); and the biggest radio story (17.4%) 
between May 17 and June 28. 
The higher numbers in cable and radio could be 
attributed to the talk hosts in both sectors. Within 
our studies at PEJ, we try to capture the media 
universe of talk and opinion with our Talk Index 
which includes seven prime time cable shows and 
five radio talk hosts. Here we will treat them 
separately. First the cable talkers.
Cable Tv Talk
Our universe of cable talkers include the following: 
Lou Dobbs from CNN; Bill O’Reilly, Sean Hannity 
& Alan Colmes from Fox; Tucker Carlson, Keith 
Olbermann, Chris Matthews, Joe Scarborough for 
the first half of 2007 and Dan Abrams for the 
second half of 2007 from MSNBC.
Overall the cable news agenda is measurably 
different than other media. As stated in PEJ’s State 
of the News Media 2008 report, “the focus on 
prime time is talk, and tends toward the political 
and the controversial. More than any other 
medium we have studied, the definition of news 
differs depending on the outlet.” 
For 2007 in cable TV talk, immigration was the 
third biggest story for the year at 7.4% of the 
newshole, following presidential campaign coverage 
at 21.1% and Iraq policy debate at 13.6%. For the 
period between May 17 and June 28, we see 
immigration at 18.5% of the newshole at second 
place right after presidential campaign coverage 
at 21.1%. Also during this period, 20% of the time 
immigration was the lead story of the program. 
Immigration coverage spiked in May and June in 
comparison to the rest of the year.
The news agenda on cable to some extent depends 
not only on the channel but also on the host of 
the program. Among all the cable talkers, the one 
who was most clearly devoted to the cause of 
immigration was CNN’s Lou Dobbs. While 
throughout the whole year immigration was the 
number one story at 22%, during this specific time 
it skyrocketed to 43.1% of the time studied on Dobbs. 
Besides offering a timeline of the immigration bill 
Immigration
2008 
Campaign
Events in 
Iraq
Iraq Policy
Rivalries
in Gaza
TB 
Traveler
Iraq 
Homefront
Domestic
Terrorism
Iran
Fired U.S. 
Attorneys
Percent of newshole
9.2
7.1
4.2
2.8
2.3
1.8
1.6
1.6
1.6
8.9
chart three   TOP 10 STORIES fOR all MEDIa May 17 – JuNE 27, 2007
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debates within the Senate, Dobbs openly criticized 
the bill as an amnesty bill for illegal aliens in the 
country, pointed out how the bill would cost 
taxpayers a lot of money, and emphasized the 
need for better border security, which according 
to him was not a part of the proposed bill. He 
also was critical of George Bush, Ted Kennedy, 
Michael Chertoff, Lindsay Graham, Trent Lott 
and their stance on immigration. The night the 
immigration bill failed, Dobbs began his program 
with these words: “Tonight the crushing defeat 
for President Bush and the Senate’s Democratic 
leadership on amnesty, a glorious victory for the 
American people.”
Immigration in 2007 was a bigger story for Bill 
O’Reilly on Fox than it was for Sean Hannity and 
Alan Colmes. While for the year it was the top story 
at 11.4% of the newshole for O’Reilly, immigration 
ranked sixth at 2.5% for Hannity & Colmes 
overall. During May 17 – June 28 immigration 
continued to be the top story for O’Reilly at 19.4%. 
For Hannity & Colmes, however, the increase was 
more significant. Immigration became the second 
biggest story during that time, occupying 16.5% 
of the newshole. During this time, O’Reilly offered 
his opposition to the bill, but in comparison to the 
rest of the year did not go beyond his usual fare 
of immigration coverage, which mostly seems to 
focus on illegal immigration, immigrant crime, 
raids and rallies. Hannity & Colmes’ coverage on 
immigration during this time seemed to center 
more on outlines of the bill and interviews with 
experts and pundits on the provisions in the 
immigration bill.
Among cable channels, MSNBC is the one trying 
to position itself as the “place for politics.” This is 
to some degree evident in its programming. While 
Tucker Carlson and Chris Matthews devoted 
43.8% and 40.9% of their newshole respectively to 
campaign coverage, Keith Olbermann was more 
concerned with Iraq war policy (23.8 % of the 
newshole) for 2007. This did not change for the 
CHaRT fOuR   IMMIgRaTION bIg STORy TIMElINE 2007, OvERall vS. CablE TalK vS. RaDIO TalK
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period from May 17 – June 28; these same topics 
continued to dominate their agenda. Campaign 
coverage for Chris Matthews was at 48.5% 
(immigration was at fourth place with 5.1%). 
For Olbermann, immigration as an issue was not 
even in the top 10; he continued to devote his time 
to Iraq policy and campaign coverage. Tucker 
was the only MSNBC host studied that showed 
some interest in the bill. Immigration coverage 
was at number two at 18.8% after campaign 
coverage (39.9%). 
Radio Talk
As we state in our State of the News Media 2008 
report, “one of the most striking characteristics  
of talk radio is its tendency for hosts to seize on 
the news and amplify those events.”  Immigration 
policy coverage accounted for 22 % of the newshole 
for talk radio during May 17 – June 28. Analysis  
of this time period underlined the ideological 
differences between the conservative and liberal 
talk radio hosts. Conservative radio hosts devoted 
31% of their newshole to the coverage of immigration, 
while their liberal counterparts paid little attention.  
Immigration ranked at sixth place with only 3.6% 
of the newshole for this period among liberals.
Conservative talkers Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity 
and Michael Savage were highly critical in their 
coverage of the immigration bill. Rush Limbaugh 
on May 18 accused democrats of trying to destroy 
America. He also was highly critical of Trent Lott 
for supporting the immigration bill and his attack on 
talk radio saying, “Talk Radio is running America, 
we have to deal with that problem.” The “drive-by” 
media, as Limbaugh likes to reference (i.e. the liberal 
media), also was on the receiving end of criticism 
for their coverage of the immigration bill. Limbaugh 
more than once criticized The New York Times 
for push polling on the issue.
In his coverage of the immigration bill, Sean 
Hannity—like Limbaugh—labeled the bill as an 
amnesty bill, and throughout the period continued 
his attack calling the bill “a disaster on many 
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levels.” On June 7, he said the amnesty bill was 
not dead yet but was on its way, a victory for 
conservatism. 
Michael Savage, the wildcard among conservative 
talkers, was more explosive in his coverage of the 
immigration bill. On May 17, he called Bush a traitor 
and a sellout for his stance on immigration and he 
likened the wave of immigration to the Alamo, 
proclaiming, “We are not giving away the sovereignty 
of America.” On June 28, he opened his program with 
bells tolling for the death of the immigration bill. 
Immigration coverage was not on the agenda of liberal 
talkers Ed Schultz and Randi Rhodes. In fact, for the 
whole year, Randi Rhodes did not devote any time 
to the topic of immigration in the hours studied. 
When Ed Schultz commented on the demise of the 
immigration bill, it was to say that the bill should 
have included checks and balances, and to declare 
his support for the guest worker program. The 
ideological division between the conservative and 
the liberal talk radio hosts was clear on this issue.
Newspapers
The immigration debate was the biggest story for 
newspapers in May 17 – June 28, filling 8% of the 
front page newshole studied, closely followed by 
campaign coverage at 7.5% and events in Iraq at 
7.1%. The emphasis in print is greater than it first 
seems, considering our analysis includes only the 
front page articles of national, regional and local 
papers.3 What was most striking about newspa-
pers’ coverage during this specific period was that, 
besides offering the timeline for the immigration 
bill within the Senate, they also highlighted some 
aspects that other forms of media seemed to 
overlook. For example, The New York Times on 
May 20 offered the immigrants’ point of view on 
the bill in an article entitled “Illegal Migrants 
Dissect Details Of Senate Deal.” On June 25, The 
Washington Post spotlighted how individual states 
were cracking down on illegal immigration as a 
response to the stalled immigration bill with an 
article entitled “Illegal Immigrants Targeted By 
States; Impasse on Hill Spurs New Laws.”  The Los 
Angeles Times on May 27 actually provided details 
of the proposed immigration legislation and 
explained how the bill was pulling the GOP in two 
directions in “Immigration Debate Puts Up a Wall 
in the GOP; Pursue Latino Voters or Please the 
Party’s Base? The Senate Overhaul Bill Reveals a 
Split on What Political Road is Best for Republicans.” 
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At the regional and local level there was evidence 
to suggest there was more coverage in high profile 
immigration states such as Texas and California.  
Immigration was the top story for local papers 
during May 17 – June 28 at 11.9% of the newshole; 
for regional papers it was the third biggest story 
at 9.2% (for national papers immigration was the 
second biggest story at 7.4% of the newshole). 
The Boston Globe article dated June 5 drew 
attention to the fact that if the bill passed, newly 
legalized immigrants would be contributing $26 
billion to the U.S. economy over a decade. The 
Albuquerque Journal spotlighted the labor 
shortage in New Mexico and immigration law 
limitations with “Finding a Way to Solve State’s 
Shortage of Workers” on June 10. On June 29 after 
the bill failed, the Bakersfield Californian ran an 
article on local reaction to the Senate’s rejection of 
immigration reform. The Chattanooga Times Free 
Press had an array of articles on: the lack of local 
support for the bill on May 29 with “Immigration 
Bill Draws Opposition from Area Lawmakers” and 
then on June 26 with “Immigration Bill Lacks Area 
Support in Senate;” local employers’ cautious 
approval of the guest worker program in the 
immigration deal on May 25; and on June 24 
localizing the context of the bill with “Bush’s 
Immigration Zeal Has Texas Roots.”
IMMIgRaTION bIll COvERagE:  
SPaNISH vS. ENglISH laNguagE 
MEDIa, a bRIEf COMPaRISON
There is evidence, too, that the English-language 
media differ significantly in coverage of immigra-
tion from Spanish-language media. This year at 
PEJ, as part of the larger ethnic media analysis 
within our State of the News Media 2008 report, 
we conducted a snapshot study of the coverage in 
the leading Spanish-language television networks 
and three major papers and compared that with 
similar English-language press from one key period 
in 2007, June 25-29, the week the immigration bill 
died in the U.S. Senate. This to some degree allowed 
us to see how Spanish vs. English-language 
mainstream media covered the immigration bill.
PEJ examined Spanish-language network national 
evening news on the two major stations, Telemun-
do and Univision, and compared it to evening 
network news on the major networks, ABC, CBS and 
NBC. For print, The New York Times, Los Angeles 
Times and The Washington Post were compared to 
three Spanish language newspapers, El Diario-La 
Prensa, La Opinión and El Nuevo Herald. 
The study found that ABC, NBC and CBS covered 
the issue substantially less. In total there were eight 
stories during this period. What they did produce 
was given high prominence with most—six out of 
the eight—among the first three stories aired. By 
comparison, Telemundo and Univision aired a 
total of 18 stories focusing on the immigration bill 
during the same period. Of these stories, 14 aired 
as one of the first three segments.
Overall
National
Regional
Local
Percent of newshole
8.0
9.2
11.9
7.4
Source: PEJ, A Year in the News 2007. 
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In print, there was more continuity between the 
English-language and Spanish-language press. As 
stated in our study, “overall, the English-language 
papers had more stories but gave them less 
prominence than the Spanish-language papers. 
The three English-language papers ran a total of 37 
stories during the five days (pretty evenly distrib-
uted among the three) while the Spanish papers 
ran 22. The majority of the English-language 
stories fell in the inside pages—23 out of 37. Just 
14 made page 1. The Spanish-language papers, on 
the other hand, ran 15 of the 22 on page 1.”
By and large, as our analysis suggested, “during the 
week the immigration bill died in the Senate, 
consumers turning to Spanish-language media for 
their news probably came away with a different 
perception of the meaning and impact of the defeat. 
They learned about angles not focused on in much 
of the English-language media, heard from different 
people and, especially in broadcast, often heard 
what the reporters themselves felt about the situation.” 
The English-language media tended to focus on the 
politics of the bill, the winners and the losers in the 
Senate. The Spanish-language press focused much 
more on immigrants themselves and the possible 
ramifications of the bill within the ethnic community.
Now that we have considered the specific case of 
the immigration bill coverage, let us look into how 
much coverage immigration received across media 
sectors in general.
IMMIgRaTION COvERagE ON CablE Tv
An analysis of 17 cable shows, 885 hours of cable 
news, with a total of 22,823 stories for the year 
2007 revealed that immigration filled 4.8% of the 
overall newshole, third after presidential campaign 
(15.2%) and Iraq policy (10.2%) coverage.
Time of day is an important element to consider in 
cable TV news agenda. During the night, cable’s 
talk hosts fill prime time with stories they choose 
to amplify. During the day, the audience is more 
likely to see stories on crime, accident, disaster and 
breaking news events. This was the case in immi-
gration stories, too. While most of the immigration 
stories on nighttime cable centered around policy 
and legislation discussion, during the day the audi-
ence was more likely to see immigrant crime, rally 
and protest stories. Live May Day rallies from Chicago 
and Los Angeles on CNN Live; ICE raids and 
illegal border crossing stories on MSNBC Live and 
Fox Live were some of the typical examples of the 
day fare. 
In the year 2007, immigration policy discussion 
did not make the top 10 stories list for CNN Live. 
By contrast for CNN evening, it was the biggest 
third story of the year at 8.5%, in part due to Lou 
Dobbs’ efforts. For MSNBC, the case was different. 
Immigration was not in the top 10 stories for 
evening programs, but was present in daytime at 
3.5% of the newshole as the fourth biggest story 
overall, right behind the death of Anna Nicole 
Smith. Immigration was present both on daytime 
and evening for Fox but in different doses. During 
daytime it was the overall ninth biggest story of 
the year with 1.7%; and for the evening it was the 
third biggest story at 5.0%, due in part this time to 
O’Reilly’s coverage of the issue.
The English-language media tended to focus on 
the politics of the bill, the winners and the 
losers in the Senate. The Spanish-language 
press focused much more on immigrants 
themselves and the possible ramifications of 
the bill within the ethnic community.
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RANK NEWS RADIO hEADLINES ONLY ALL TALK MEDIA OvERALL 
1 Iraq Policy Debate 7% 2008 Campaign 17% 2008 Campaign 11%
2 Events in Iraq 5% Iraq Policy Debate 12% Iraq Policy Debate 8%
3 U.S. Economy 3% Immigration 4% Events in Iraq 6%
4 2008 Campaign 2% global Warming 3% Immigration 3%
5 U.S. Domestic Terrorism 2% Iran 3% Iran 2%
6 Iran 2% Domestic Terrorism 2% U.S. Domestic Terrorism 2%
7 Fired U.S. Attorneys 2% New Democratic Congress 2% U.S. Economy 2%
8 Iraq homefront 1% valerie Plame Investigation 2% Iraq homefront 2%
9 vA Tech Shooting 1% Fired U.S. Attorneys 2% Pakistan 2%
10 gas/Oil Prices 1% Events in Iraq 1% Fired U.S. Attorneys 1%
Source: PEJ, A Year in the News 2007. 
TablE ONE     TOP STORIES 2007: NEwS RaDIO HEaDlINES vS. TalK RaDIO vS. MEDIa OvERall
Overall, as also stated in the State of the News 
Media 2008 report, “MSNBC focused itself around 
Washington, the campaign, and political scandal, 
often with an eye sharply critical of the Bush 
administration.  Fox was more oriented to crime, 
celebrity and the media than its rivals. And CNN 
tended by degrees to devote somewhat more time 
across a range of topics.” 
The somewhat similar evening newscasts of Fox—
Special Report with Brit Hume and Fox Report 
with Shepard Smith—differ in their rundown of 
the day’s news. While Smith’s is somewhat more 
oriented toward a mix of crime, disaster, accidents, 
with a marked dose of celebrity and entertainment, 
Hume’s program is focused on politics and govern-
ment. This was reflected in their coverage of 
immigration as well. While for Smith, immigration 
was not a part of the top 10 stories of the year, for 
Hume it was at number five, filling 4.2% of the 
newshole studied overall. Besides the failed 
immigration bill coverage, stories on Hume’s nightly 
news were mostly on state-level immigration 
legislation news and immigrant crime. 
It is also important to note that presidential 
campaign stories on the topic of immigration 
primarily received coverage within cable. The GOP 
debate in which Mitt Romney and Rudy Giuliani 
clashed; then-NY Governor Eliot Spitzer’s attempt 
to provide driving licenses to illegal immigrants 
and the subsequent stance or lack of stance by 
Hillary Clinton on that issue; and John McCain’s 
“flip flopping stance” in regards to immigration 
were some of the topics.
RaDIO
The role of talk radio in immigration policy discus-
sion was largely covered in our section devoted to 
the immigration bill. Here we will briefly consider 
what radio news headlines had to offer on immigra-
tion in 2007. Almost all stations offered some 
summary of the news. For this we analyzed ABC 
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and CBS headline news every day of the week at 9 AM 
and 5 PM: four headline segments each day which 
roughly made 20 minutes of radio headline news. 
In general for 2007, radio news headlines from CBS 
and ABC were in many ways solid supplements 
to the narrow and selective talk news agenda. In 
general, they offer an impressively broad if quick 
look at the day’s events. What is absent is depth, 
any kind of nuanced analysis or comparison of 
multiple angles on any given issue. 
When it came to immigration in 2007, immigration 
coverage was confined mostly to May and June, 
which coincided with the immigration legislation 
discussion in the Senate. And even then, immigra-
tion was only able to secure 0.5% of the newshole 
of radio headlines.
NEwSPaPERS
What was unique about newspapers’ coverage of 
immigration policy was that—much like cable—it 
devoted somewhat continuous coverage through-
out the whole year. Immigration coverage was 
present, albeit in various degrees, throughout 2007. 
National newspapers such as The New York Times, 
Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post stood 
out most in their coverage of immigration. Not only 
did these newspapers offer detailed coverage of the 
failed immigration bill, but also offered stories on 
immigrant life and immigration legislation and 
discussion in general. All immigration stories in 
national papers were covered by internal staff. 
An important sign of the local nature of immigration 
was that smaller newspapers devoted their own 
staff to covering this issue. As we noted in our yearly 
report, “for major national news stories, local and 
metropolitan papers tend to rely on the wires, 
especially the front pages.”  But this was not the 
case in the coverage of immigration in 2007. At the 
mid-level, 82.3% of coverage on immigration was 
from staff reporters versus about 51.7% of Iraq stories 
and 78.9% U.S. economy stories. At the most local 
level, 65.3% were written by internal staff compared 
to 47.6% of presidential campaign, 29.3% Iraq, and 
53.5 % of U.S. economy (see Chart Eight).
NETwORK Tv
For this section, three network’s weekday nightly 
newscasts, and the first 30 minutes for the weekday 
morning shows were considered. This represents 
about 27,600 minutes of news in 2007.
The most striking finding is that, overall in 2007, 
immigration was not among the top 10 stories 
for any of the networks except during May and 
June, which coincides with the immigration 
legislation discussion in the Senate. In May, it 
was the fourth biggest story (with 4.4% of the 
newshole), and in June it was the third biggest 
story (with 5.5%). Both network morning and 
evening news were more concerned with the 
coverage of the presidential campaign, the war 
in Iraq and the U.S. economy.
Network nightly news compared to cable and 
network morning is, “where viewers can see stories 
that have been checked and edited, where the 
words from the correspondents have been 
carefully written rather than spoken from quick 
notes, where producers and correspondents have 
discussed the content of the stories, and the 
pictures and the words have been carefully 
matched in an editing room.” Our yearly content 
analysis of news showed that for 2007, correspondent 
packages made up 82% of the time on the nightly 
newscasts. This was the case for immigration 
stories as well: 85.2% of the time immigration stories 
60 A REPORT ON ThE MEDIA AND ThE IMMIgRATION DEbATE 
PE
RC
EN
T
100
80
60
40
20
0
Overall National Regional Local
Internal Staff Wire Combo Wire/Staff Other News Outlet
PE
RC
EN
T
100
80
60
40
20
0
Package Interview Staff Live Anchor Read 
(Voice Over/Tell Story)
Overall Morning Network Evening Network
CHaRT EIgHT 
CHaRT NINE 
  HOw NEwSPaPERS COvERED IMMIgRaTION 2007
  HOw NETwORK Tv COvERED IMMIgRaTION 2007
Source:  PEJ, A Year in the News 2007. 
Source:  PEJ, A Year in the News 2007. 
on nightly news were correspondent packages, and 
6.5% of the time they were interviews. Immigration 
stories on the morning network news were 
interviews more than half of the time (52.9%) as 
opposed to packages (32.5%). 
ONlINE
For this section we considered the lead news coverage 
every weekday on five of the most popular news 
sites on the Internet: AOL News, CNN.com, Google 
News, MSNBC.com and Yahoo.com. 
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As we also stated in our State of the News Media 
2008 report: 
 Overall, the lead news agenda online was the most 
international of any media we studied. At least in 
their top five stories, which is roughly analogous to 
the number of stories found on a front page of a 
newspaper and generally describes the number of 
stories featured at the top of the Web page, the 
leading Web sites studied put a premium on 
international news that far outweighed any other 
medium. Fully 25% of the top coverage dealt with 
non-U.S. international stories. This was nearly six 
times that of cable (4%), three times that of 
commercial network evening news and the 
network morning news (8%), nearly twice that 
of newspapers (13%), and about 60% more than 
radio news programming (15%).
Therefore, it was no surprise to see that some domestic 
topic areas and specific news got less prominence 
online. A monthly look at online coverage for 
immigration found that, it was part of the top 10 list 
only in May and June, and was absent for the rest 
of the year. In May, it was the sixth biggest story with 
2.6% of the newshole, and in June it was fifth biggest 
story with 4.7%. Overall, immigration was the 12th 
story of the year at 1% of the online newshole.
Overall among the websites, immigration made it 
into the yearly top 10 story list only on CNN.com. 
It was the seventh biggest story for the year at 1.8%.  
This can be in part attributed to the fact that the 
CNN.com homepage mirrors to a certain degree 
the news tendencies of its cable counterpart. Lou 
Dobbs’ commentary pieces on immigration 
appeared on CNN.com at least five times during 
the period from March to November.  
As we mentioned in our State of the News Media 
2008 report, “both AOL and Yahoo use wire services 
for more than 90% of their lead news coverage on 
their sites, most of it coming from the Associated 
Press. Google News, on the other hand—a site that 
produces no original content—had 17% of wire 
stories and 82% of the coverage was original report-
ing by the cited news organization.” For CNN.com, 
1 Events in Iraq 11%
2 2008 Campaign 7%
3 Iraq Policy Debate 6%
4 Iran 3%
5 Pakistan 3%
6 U.S. Economy 2%
7 Afghanistan 2%
8 Domestic Terrorism 2%
9 Fired U.S. Attorneys 2%
10 Israeli /Palestinian Conflict 2%
Source: PEJ, A Year in the News 2007. 
TablE TwO    TOP STORIESfOR ONlINE SITES 2007
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most of the stories were by internal staff reporting 
(61%) and wire reports (32%). For MSNBC.com, 
54% of the lead stories came from the wires. Overall 
the same pattern was evident for immigration stories 
across these news websites. Most of immigration 
stories online were wire stories (44.3%) while 27.4% 
of the lead stories on immigration were internal staff 
reporting and original reporting by the cited news 
organization (also at 27.4% of the online newshole).
CONCluSION
The story of immigration in the news in 2007 was 
mostly a political one. The immigration agenda in 
the news was narrow. More than half of the stories 
of the news space studied pertained to legislation, 
most of it a particular bill in the Senate. The fuller 
picture of immigration issues with all its complexity 
tended to be covered in print more than in other 
media. In 2008, this trend toward political controversy 
might continue. We might well expect immigration 
to be more prominent in presidential campaigns. In 
2007, during which most of the presidential election 
coverage was dominated by horserace politics, 
immigration received minimal coverage within the 
campaign. Out of 5,657 presidential campaign 
stories, only 75 of them related to immigration. But 
with the growing Latino population, it would be of 
interest to see if immigration as an issue will become 
a bigger part of the campaign rhetoric in 2008.
One important trend many scholars draw attention 
to is the relation between economic uncertainty 
and attitudes toward immigration as an issue. 
Usually, the intensity of feelings toward immigrants 
and immigration is closely related to economic 
conditions. As we noted in our annual report, in 
January 2008, economic concerns rose significantly 
to rival the war in Iraq as the top problem facing 
the country. At the same time, it also began 
driving the presidential primary debates and 
became a top issue influencing the primary vote. 
Studies show opposition towards immigration 
usually rises in periods of recession. It would be of 
interest to see if this will be reflected in the news 
media coverage of immigration, especially now that 
it appears U.S. economy perils/ worries coverage is 
growing within the English-language media. 
In the more qualitative assessment of the news on 
immigration, a trend of national security concerns 
influencing the attitude toward immigration seemed 
to stand out. The portrayal of the immigrant was 
more likely to be that of an outsider. Further content 
analysis on frame and tone could provide detail 
on how news media in the U.S. give meaning to 
immigration as an issue. Here we provided you 
with how much attention immigration received 
across five media sectors in the U.S., which aspects 
of immigration received more reporting, and by 
whom most of the coverage was provided.
endnotes
1  Newshole is defined as the time or space available in an outlet for news content. 
2  For an explanation of the distinction of immigration as a topic and immigration as a big story please refer to the methodology section of this report, 
which can be found at http://www.brookings.edu.
3  In our sample the national papers are The New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, USA Today and Los Angeles Times; the regional 
papers are the boston globe, Star Tribune, Austin Statesman and the Albuquerque Journal; the local papers are the Star beacon, bakersfield 
Californian, Sun Chronicle and the Chattanooga Times Free Press.
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On the whole, immigration is not at the top of the 
list of concerns for the vast majority of Americans. 
It occasionally breaks through as an important issue, 
but that almost always happens in response to outside 
stimuli. And on the rare occasions when worries 
about immigration have reached double digits, it 
was still less important to voters than problems 
related to war and peace and economic well-being. 
Precisely because immigration tends to be a major 
issue for only a modest minority of voters, relatively 
small groups can disproportionately influence the 
debate. So can media figures who choose to make 
immigration one of their central causes.
One of the most important changes in public opinion 
over the past decade is the rise of immigration as a 
specific concern for conservatives and Republicans. 
While conservatives and Republicans have, over 
time, been somewhat more sympathetic to 
restrictions on immigration than liberals and 
Democrats, this issue has not until now been defined 
by the usual divides of ideology and partisanship. 
Indeed, conservatives have been split on immigration. 
Free market, libertarian and business-oriented 
conservatives gravitated toward a more open or 
permissive view, and cultural conservatives toward 
a more restrictionist view. Liberals with strong ties 
to organized labor have sometimes favored more 
restrictive policies (with an eye toward pushing up 
wage rates by increasing the competition for labor) 
while other liberals (Latinos notably, but also cultural 
liberals, civil libertarians and, more recently, leaders 
in the service-oriented parts of the labor movement) 
have sympathized with more open policies. If the 
two dominant ideological groups split within 
themselves, so, too, have Republicans and Democrats. 
At times of economic stress, opposition to immigra-
tion has increased among liberals and Democrats, 
again reflecting their concerns over job opportunities 
and wages.
But there is evidence that the link between 
restrictionist views on immigration and Republican 
political identification has strengthened during the 
Bush years, despite President Bush’s advocacy of 
immigration reform. For many years, Gallup has 
asked its respondents: “On the whole, do you think 
immigration is a good thing or a bad thing for this 
country today?” In the first year of the Bush presi-
dency, as Chart One shows, Democrats were slightly 
more likely than Republicans to see immigration 
as “a bad thing.” Then came two noticeable spikes 
in Republican opposition to immigration. In June 
2002, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
proportion of Republicans with a negative view of 
immigration soared. The post-9/11 reaction 
Americans regularly change their minds about immigration. While certain political and demographic 
subgroups are fairly constant in their opinions, overall attitudes can shift sharply in response to 
changes in the economy, fears of terrorism, organized media campaigns, the way the issue is 
framed and the centrality of the issue to debates in Congress. 
MIgRaTINg aTTITuDES,  
SHIfTINg OPINIONS
the role of public opinion in the immigration debate 
E.J. DIONNE, JR.
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against immigration was much stronger among 
Republicans than among Democrats or independents.
For much of the rest of the Bush presidency, 
negative views of immigration among Republicans 
declined. Then came the second sharp rise in June 
2007, just as the debate over the immigration 
reform bill was raging in Congress. As we’ll see in 
a moment, there is evidence that the shift among 
Republicans was related to the energetic advocacy 
of a restrictionist position on conservative talk radio. 
The general, if irregular, trend toward greater 
hostility to immigration was captured in other 
surveys as well. For example, the Pew Research 
Center found that the proportion of Americans 
who view immigrants as a burden to the country 
has grown. In 2000, 38 percent agreed that 
“immigrants today are a burden on our country 
because they take our jobs, housing and health 
care.” This sentiment rose to 52 percent in 2006.
Chart Two suggests a steady increase in concern 
over immigration on the part of conservatives 
through the years of the Bush presidency. In Bush’s 
first year in office, there were only modest differences 
among liberals, moderates and conservatives on a 
Gallup question asking respondents whether they 
personally worried about immigration “a great 
deal, a fair amount, only a little or not at all.” In 
March 2001, only 31 percent of self-described 
conservatives said they worried a great deal about 
immigration, compared with 27 percent of 
moderates and 23 percent of liberals.
The proportion of conservatives worrying a great 
deal about immigration reached 53 percent by 
March 2008 (comparable to a peak of 54 percent in 
2007). By contrast, the proportion of liberals who 
worried a great deal about immigration in 2008 
stood almost exactly where it stood in 2001. (The 
peak for liberal concern, at 40 percent, came in 
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March 2006, when pro-immigration groups, 
particularly Latinos, organized rallies in support of 
immigrants.) Moderates worried more about 
immigration over time than liberals, but still far less 
so than conservatives. Again, it is significant that the 
greatest polarization between liberals and conserva-
tives on this measure—reflected by the line at the 
bottom on Chart Two—came in and after 2007, the 
year of the immigration reform debate in Congress.
The most recent data suggest that immigration 
continues to be of far more concern to conserva-
tives than liberals but that it is not a partisan issue. 
Tables One and Two report the findings of a survey 
conducted by The Washington Post and ABC News 
in July 2008. The survey gave respondents a long 
list of issues and asked them to rank each issue’s 
importance. Not surprisingly, the economy ranked 
as the most important, followed by gasoline prices, 
the war in Iraq, education and health care.
Immigration ranked relatively low on the scale, 
just below relations with other countries and just 
above appointments to the Supreme Court. But 
there were striking demographic and ideological 
differences among respondents’ judgments of the 
importance of the immigration issue, as Table Two 
makes clear. As we’ll see in more detail later, lower 
income respondents and those with less formal 
education were more likely to see immigration as 
an important issue—and especially more likely to 
rank it as an “extremely” important issue. Voters who 
felt financially insecure were also more likely to rank 
immigration as more important. The ideological 
differences were even more stark: While 39 percent 
of conservatives rated immigration as “extremely” 
important, only 18 percent of liberals and 21 percent 
of moderates did so. At the other end of the scale, 
liberals and college graduates were the only two 
groups to reach double digits in giving an extremely 
low ranking of the immigration issue. Interestingly, 
CHaRT TwO    wHO wORRIES abOuT IMMIgRaTION? (PERCENT wHO wORRy “a gREaT DEal” by IDEOlOgy) 
Source:  The gallup Organization, Inc. The surveys were conducted in March 6–9, 2008; March 11–14, 2007; March 13–16, 2006; March 7–10, 2005; March 
8–11, 2004; March 24–25, 2003; March 4–7, 2002; March 5–7, 2001. 
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 IMPORTANT NOT AS IMPORTANT
no op.net extremely very net somewhat less 
The economy 92 50 41 8 7 1 0
gasoline prices and energy policy 85 48 37 15 11 4 *
The war in Iraq 83 42 41 17 14 3 *
Education 81 37 44 19 15 4 0
health care 78 39 39 22 15 7 *
The US campaign against terrorism 74 37 36 26 21 5 *
Social Security 73 38 35 27 23 3 0
Ethics in government 72 37 34 26 20 6 2
The federal budget deficit 72 34 38 27 21 5 1
Taxes 70 30 40 30 23 6 1
Relations with other countries 69 28 41 30 24 6 1
Immigration Issues 63 27 36 37 29 7 1
Appointments to the  
U.S. Supreme Court
60 26 35 36 25 11 3
global warming and other  
environmental issues
58 27 31 42 26 16 *
gun control 50 23 27 49 29 20 *
The candidates’ choice for vice 
presidential running mates
48 15 33 49 35 14 3
Social issues such as abortion and 
gay civil unions
39 19 20 61 30 31 1
wORDINg Of quESTION: “ For each item I name, please tell me how important it will be in your vote for president this 
year. Will it be an extremely important issue, very important, somewhat important or less 
important than that?”
table one    aMERICaNS’ RaNKINg Of MOST IMPORTaNT ISSuES IN 2008 ElECTION (July 2008)
Source:  Washington Post/AbC News Poll conducted July 10–13, 2008, among a random national sample of 1,119 adults, including additional interviews 
with randomly selected African Americans, for a total of 209 black respondents. 
Note: Net values may not total 100 percent because of rounding.
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 IMPORTANT NOT AS IMPORTANT
no op.net extremely very net somewhat less 
All 63 27 36 37 29 7 1
18–64 61 26 35 39 31 8 *
65+ 71 31 40 27 21 6 2
Non-college 69 31 38 30 25 5 1
College grad 47 17 31 53 39 13 0
among whites:        
Non-college 67 30 38 32 27 5 1
College grad 47 16 31 53 40 13 0
Household income:        
Less than $50,000 70 32 39 28 23 5 1
$50,000 or more 56 21 35 44 34 9 0
HH income among whites:        
Less than $50,000 69 32 37 29 23 6 2
$50,000 or more 56 21 36 44 35 9 0
feelings of financial security:        
very/Somewhat secure 60 23 37 40 32 7 *
very/Somewhat insecure 67 33 34 32 24 8 1
Liberal 54 18 36 45 33 13 1
Moderate 58 21 36 42 35 7 0
Conservative 73 39 34 27 21 6 0
Democrat 61 26 35 38 29 9 1
Republican 65 24 41 35 29 6 0
Independent 61 24 37 39 31 8 0
2008 vote preference:        
McCain 69 26 43 31 25 6 0
Obama 58 26 32 41 33 3 1
wORDINg Of quESTION: “ For each item I name, please tell me how important it will be in your vote for president this 
year. Will it be an extremely important issue, very important, somewhat important or less 
important than that?” Analyzed below are those saying immigration issues.
table two    HOw IMMIgRaTION affECTS aMERICaNS’ 2008 PRESIDENTIal vOTE (% by SElECTED DEMOgRaPHIC aND POlITICal gROuPS July 2008)
Source:  Washington Post/AbC News Poll conducted July 10–13, 2008, among a random national sample of 1,119 adults, including additional interviews 
with randomly selected African Americans, for a total of 209 black respondents. 
Note: Net values may not total 100 percent because of rounding.
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differences between Republicans and Democrats in 
rating the importance of immigration were minimal, 
though supporters of John McCain assigned the 
issue greater importance than did supporters of 
Barack Obama—in part because of McCain’s relative 
strength among conservatives and Obama’s relative 
strength among the college educated.
Conservative talk radio has played an important role 
in the rise of immigration as an ideological issue on 
the right. At the least, it reinforced the restrictionist 
views that many conservative Republicans already 
held. But it may also have moved a significant 
share of conservative Republicans toward more 
restrictionist views generally and a more forceful 
position against illegal immigration in particular. 
At the request of this project, the Pew Research 
Center included questions on its December 2007 
survey that probed respondents’ attitudes toward 
immigration and their media consumption habits. 
Because the survey was largely about the presiden-
tial campaign, the media questions specifically 
asked respondents about the sources of their 
election information. 
To test the impact of different ways of framing the 
immigration question, Pew split its sample and 
asked two forms of the same question. Half of the 
sample was asked: “Thinking about immigrants 
who are currently living in the U.S. illegally. … 
Do you favor or oppose providing amnesty to 
illegal immigrants currently in the country if they 
pass background checks, pay fines and have jobs?” 
The other half was asked: “Thinking about 
immigrants who are currently living in the U.S. 
illegally. … Do you favor or oppose providing a 
way for illegal immigrants currently in the country 
to gain legal citizenship if they pass background 
checks, pay fines and have jobs?” Note that the 
second version of the question dropped the word 
“amnesty,” an important buzzword for those 
favoring more stringent immigration restrictions.
Strikingly, both versions of the question drew a 
positive response. When asked about a solution 
that included “amnesty,” 50 percent said they were 
in favor and 42 percent were opposed. When asked 
about a path to citizenship without reference to 
“amnesty,” 58 percent were in favor and 35 percent 
were opposed. The eight-point swing is testimony 
to the power of the word “amnesty” in pushing 
respondents away from support for a comprehensive 
solution. At the same time, a plurality was still 
willing to back a path to legalization even when 
the word “amnesty” was used.
But the most striking findings came when these 
data were analyzed to take into account whether 
respondents relied on talk radio as a primary source 
of political information. Table Three summarizes 
attitudes toward a path to citizenship for illegal 
immigrants broken down by talk radio listenership, 
party and ideology. (Because of splits in the sample, 
talk radio listeners were asked only the form of the 
question that did not use the word “amnesty.”) 
For the public at large, views on the immigration 
question among listeners to talk radio were not 
much different from those of non-listeners. But 
Conservative talk radio has played an important 
role in the rise of immigration as an ideological 
issue on the right. At the least, it reinforced  
the restrictionist views that many conservative 
Republicans already held. But it may also have 
moved a significant share of conservative  
Republicans toward more restrictionist views 
generally and a more forceful position against 
illegal immigration in particular.
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wORDINg Of quESTIONS: “ Now I’d like to ask you about some specific ways in which you might be getting news 
about the presidential campaign. For each item that I read, please tell me how often, if 
ever, you learn something about the presidential campaign or the candidates from this 
source. how often, if ever, do you learn something about the presidential campaign or the 
candidates from ... talk radio shows—regularly, sometimes, hardly ever, or never?”
                 “ Thinking about immigrants who are currently living in the U.S. illegally. ... Do you favor or 
oppose providing a way for illegal immigrants currently in the country to gain legal citizen-
ship if they pass background checks, pay fines and have jobs?”
Source: Pew Research Center, December 2007.
Notes:  The only statistically significant differences within groups across talk radio habits are among liberals (significant difference on favor) and among 
conservative Republicans (significant difference on oppose). The non-listening group also includes the categories “Don’t Listen” and “Don’t Know.”
TablE THREE   IMPaCT Of TalK RaDIO ON aMERICaNS’ aTTITuDE TOwaRD IMMIgRaTION
gET INFORMATION AbOUT ThE CAMPAIgN  
FROM TALK RADIO REgULARLY/SOMETIMES
gET INFORMATION AbOUT ThE CAMPAIgN FROM 
TALK RADIO hARDLY EvER/NEvER
path to citizenship or amnesty 
favor oppose favor oppose
Total 57 36 (284) 59 35 (419)
Republicans 49 48 (82) 61 35 (109)
Democrats 60 32 (80) 63 32 (141)
Independents 64 29 (104) 54 37 (135)
Rep/Rep Lean 54 43 (129) 59 37 (146)
Dem/Dem Lean 64 29 (124) 62 31 (223)
Conservatives 47 47 (141) 52 39 (150)
Moderates 56 37 (88) 60 36 (165)
Liberals 90 10 (46) 73 21 (82)
Conserv Reps   41 54 (66) 62 34 (70)
Mod/Lib Reps 69 31 (16) 61 38 (39)
Cons/Mod Dems 51 45 (52) 55 39 (88)
Liberal Dems 89 11 (24) 79 18 (50)
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conservative Republicans who listened to talk 
radio were distinctive in their views. Among the 24 
groups examined, conservative Republicans who 
listened to talk radio constituted the single group 
firmly opposed to a path to citizenship (by 54 to 41 
percent). By contrast, conservative Republicans who 
rarely or never listened to talk radio favored a path 
to citizenship by a ratio of nearly 2–to–1, a slightly 
larger proportion than in the country as a whole. 
Despite the relatively small number of respondents 
in these subgroups, the differences between the 
two groups of conservative Republicans were 
statistically significant.
Interestingly, the only other statistically significant 
finding related to liberals who listened to talk 
radio is that they were far more favorable to a path 
to citizenship than the rest of the sample. Not 
surprisingly, the survey found that conservatives 
made up nearly half of the talk radio audience, 
liberals less than a fifth. Overall, 40 percent of 
those surveyed said they regularly or sometimes 
learned something about the campaign from talk 
radio; for conservatives, the share was 48 percent.
These findings suggest that talk radio listeners 
may now be a distinctive constituency within the 
Republican and conservative coalitions. Whether 
the attitudes of this constituency were shaped by 
the talk radio hosts or whether the hosts were 
reflecting widespread sentiment among their 
listeners is a question deserving of further study. 
But it is quite clear that the talk radio hosts 
mobilized a significant minority constituency 
against immigration reform. It’s also clear that 
conservative worries about immigration have 
grown over time. The combination proved lethal  
to immigration reform efforts in 2007.
As the accompanying study by the Project for 
Excellence in Journalism shows, conservative talk 
radio gave far more attention to the congressional 
immigration reform debate than did any other  
medium. The study found that conservative radio 
hosts devoted 31 percent of their airtime to coverage 
of immigration from May 17 to June 28, 2007, 
compared with just 3.6 percent on liberal radio 
shows. In the same period, newspapers devoted just 
8 percent of their front-page coverage to the 
immigration debate. On cable television, the study 
found that conservative hosts on Fox and CNN’s 
Lou Dobbs, television’s leading opponent of illegal 
immigration, gave far more coverage to the issue 
than did other hosts and anchors. On the right, there 
is a clear push-pull effect between the advocacy of 
talk show hosts and the views of their wing of the 
conservative Republican coalition. The immigration 
issue energized a significant part of the right while 
calling forth little militancy or concern on the left.
But conservative talk radio was not alone in fighting 
for a restrictionist position on immigration. Another 
critical important media player was Dobbs, whose 
evening broadcast on CNN became television’s 
headquarters for the battle against illegal immigration. 
Dobbs was unabashed in running story after story 
about the problems created by “illegal aliens,” 
including an ongoing series on the nation’s “broken 
borders.” Dobbs cast himself as a populist avatar 
for a struggling middle class in speaking out against 
illegal immigration, the costs of free trade and 
pressures on the middle class. His opposition to 
illegal immigration was linked to a message on 
trade and stagnating wages that was congenial to 
the labor movement, which built Dobbs a significant 
following among Democrats.1
But it is quite clear that the talk radio hosts 
mobilized a significant minority constituency 
against immigration reform. 
  A REPORT ON ThE MEDIA AND ThE IMMIgRATION DEbATE 71
Not surprisingly, the Pew survey found that 
Dobbs’ audience was smaller than the combined 
audience for talk radio shows. Overall, 22 percent 
of respondents said they “learn[ed] something 
about the presidential campaign or the candidates” 
from the Dobbs show either “regularly” or 
“sometimes,” about half the rate who said the same 
of talk radio. More importantly, the Dobbs 
audience was significantly less Republican than the 
talk radio audience. While 41 percent of Republicans 
said talk radio was a significant source of political 
news, only 15 percent said the same of Lou Dobbs. 
Looked at another way, Democrats formed a much 
larger share of the Dobbs audience than of the talk 
radio audience. 
And as Table Four shows, Dobbs’ impact on the 
immigration attitudes of respondents was much 
larger on Democrats than Republicans, and it was 
especially pronounced on moderate-to-conservative 
Democrats. (Note that Dobbs viewers were asked 
both forms of the immigration question. Their 
responses have been combined to create a large 
enough sample for analysis.) For the sample as a 
whole, there was little difference between Dobbs 
viewers and non-viewers: 55 percent of non-viewers 
favored a comprehensive solution that included a 
path to citizenship or amnesty, as did 53 percent 
of Dobbs viewers. But Democrats who said they 
regularly went to Dobbs’ program for political 
information were significantly less likely to favor 
a path to citizenship than other Democrats. And 
Dobbs’ impact was especially powerful on moderate 
and conservative Democrats. Of all the groups 
studied, Dobbs viewers in this group were the 
most firmly opposed to a comprehensive solution 
(43 percent favor, 52 percent against). At the same 
time, moderate and conservative Democrats who 
did not watch Dobbs regularly strongly favored a 
comprehensive solution (59 percent in favor, 34 
percent opposed).
These findings, taken together with the Project for 
Excellence in Journalism’s analysis of the media, 
point to how the media’s impact on the congressional 
debate fell decisively on the restrictionist side and 
almost certainly played a major role in dooming 
immigration reform in 2007. Conservative talk 
radio and Lou Dobbs paid far more attention to 
the immigration debate than did other media 
sources, and they pushed hard for defeat of the bill. 
By contrast, neutral and liberal media gave the 
debate limited coverage. Moreover, an implicit 
(and almost certainly unconscious) division of 
labor developed between talk radio and the Dobbs 
program. Each had its greatest influence on critical 
swing groups in Congress. Talk radio moved (and 
also firmed up) conservative opposition to 
comprehensive immigration reform, providing a 
strong counterweight to President Bush’s support 
for a broad measure. Dobbs’ greatest impact was 
on moderate-to-conservative Democrats—and in 
Congress, moderate-to-conservative Democrats 
(or Democrats who represented moderate and 
conservative swing constituencies) were those 
most likely to join the ranks of the opponents of 
comprehensive reform.2 It’s possible, of course, to 
exaggerate the power of the restrictionist media in 
the immigration debate. But it would be a larger 
mistake to ignore or discount the media’s role in 
making what was already a difficult situation 
impossible for advocates of comprehensive reform.
This report will explore a variety of factors shaping 
views on immigration. It will underscore the 
extent to which concern about immigration is 
sporadic and suggest that the public’s view of the 
issue is replete with ambiguity and paradox. 
Americans are philosophically pro-immigration 
but operationally in favor of a variety of restrictions, 
particularly when it comes to the receipt of taxpayer 
benefits. In principle, a majority favors a solution 
to the problem that includes a path to citizenship, 
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wORDINg Of quESTIONS: “ Now I’d like to ask you about some specific ways in which you might be getting news about 
the presidential campaign. For each item that I read, please tell me how often, if ever, you 
learn something about the presidential campaign or the candidates from this source. how 
often, if ever, do you learn something about the presidential campaign or the candidates 
from ... “Lou Dobbs Tonight” on CNN—regularly, sometimes, hardly ever or never?” 
               “ Thinking about immigrants who are currently living in the U.S. illegally. ... Do you favor 
or oppose providing a way for illegal immigrants currently in the country to gain legal 
citizenship if they pass background checks, pay fines and have jobs?” OR “Thinking about 
immigrants who are currently living in the U.S. illegally … Do you favor or oppose providing 
amnesty to illegal immigrants currently in the country if they pass background checks, 
pay fines and have jobs?”
Source: Pew Research Center, December 2007.
Notes:  The differences between Dobbs-viewing and non-Dobbs-viewing Democrats and moderate/conservative Democrats are significant. The 
non-watching group also includes the categories “Don’t Listen” and “Don’t Know.” Source: Pew Research Center, December 2007.
table four     IMPaCT Of lOu DObbS ON aMERICaNS’ aTTITuDE TOwaRD IMMIgRaTION
gET INFORMATION AbOUT ThE CAMPAIgN  
FROM LOU DObbS REgULARLY/SOMETIMES
gET INFORMATION AbOUT ThE CAMPAIgN  
FROM LOU DObbS hARDLY EvER/NEvER
path to citizenship or amnesty 
favor oppose favor oppose
Total 53 42 (303) 55 38 (944)
Republicans 51 46 (60) 47 47 (319)
Democrats 50 43 (119) 65 28 (329)
Independents 56 39 (106) 53 39 (388)
Rep/Rep Lean 55 43 (99) 48 48 (461)
Dem/Dem Lean 56 36 (171) 63 30 (523)
Conservatives 48 47 (96) 45 48 (440)
Moderates 53 44 (125) 57 36 (418)
Liberals 66 26 (68) 75 20 (219)
Conserv Reps   48 47 (37) 44 50 (216)
Mod/Lib Reps 54 47 (22) 56 40 (98)
Cons/Mod Dems 43 52 (68) 59 34 (202)
Liberal Dems 65 28 (46) 78 19 (119)
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but many within that majority are also inclined to 
deal harshly with immigrants who are in the country 
illegally. The most important finding is the energy 
created on the restrictionist side by the interaction 
between core supporters of the conservative 
Republican coalition and their radio hosts.
SPlIT-lEvEl POlITICS:  
CONgRESS, THE PRESIDENCy  
aND IMMIgRaTION
This paper deals with national findings and 
national trends, although it incorporates some 
of the conclusions of the valuable 2006 study of 
selected regions and cities by the Pew Research 
Center and the Pew Hispanic Center. But the 
national perspective is less important in the 
congressional battle over immigration, which is 
fought district-by-district in the House and 
state-by-state in the Senate. It’s therefore worth 
pausing to note that while Latinos played an 
important part in pushing for immigration reform, 
their impact on the debate may be limited by their 
relative absence in swing congressional districts. 
While the spread of Latinos across the country will 
enhance their voice in the long run, they are likely to 
have a limited impact in the short run in pushing 
marginal members of Congress in their direction. 
The national-district split also helps explain why 
the immigration issue could play very different roles 
in the presidential election and in congressional 
contests, and why restrictionist media could have a 
much larger role in the congressional debate than 
on a president’s views. A Latino backlash against 
Republicans could hurt their nominee for president. 
John McCain’s past efforts on immigration reform 
could offset this effect, though a Pew Hispanic 
Center survey released in mid-July 2008 suggested 
that McCain, despite his history, was having 
difficulty blunting the Latino reaction against his 
party. A backlash against illegal immigration could 
conceivably help at least some Republicans 
running for Congress, though the issue has had 
only a limited effect in recent congressional 
contests as the GOP’s candidates battled a broad 
anti-Republican tide. 
In the presidential election, Latino votes could 
well tip Western states that voted for President Bush 
in 2004 to the Democrats, who enjoyed a Latino 
surge in 2006. A study released in December 2007 
by the Pew Hispanic Center found that 57 percent 
of registered voters who are Hispanic identified 
themselves as Democrats, compared with 23 
percent who identified as Republicans—a 34-point 
advantage. In July 2006, the Democratic Latino 
advantage was just 21 points. Immigration has a 
lot to do with the widening of this gap. That same 
Pew study found that Hispanics gave Democrats a 
41 percent to 14 percent edge on dealing with 
illegal immigration.
This shift will matter in several swing states, 
notably in New Mexico, where people of Hispanic 
origin account for 42.6 percent of the state’s 
population; Arizona (25.3 percent Hispanic); 
Nevada (19.7 percent Hispanic); and Colorado 
(17.1 percent Hispanic). It should be noted that 
Arizona, because it is McCain’s home state, is less 
likely to be a swing state in this election.
Yet the Hispanic population is quite small in the 
limited number of highly competitive districts that 
will determine control of the House. Based on the 
results of the 2006 election, some 34 Democratic 
While Latinos played an important part in pushing 
for immigration reform, their impact on the 
debate may be limited by their relative absence 
in swing congressional districts. 
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districts are potentially vulnerable to Republican 
challenge (even if the actual number, given strong 
Democratic trends, may prove to be significantly 
smaller).3 In only four of those districts is the 
Hispanic population more than 18 percent. In 19 of 
them, it is under 3 percent. These are the races in 
which Republicans may be tempted to use the issue 
of illegal immigration. In the 15 districts where the 
Democratic incumbent received 51 percent or less in 
2006, 11 have Hispanic populations below 10 percent. 
(All Hispanic population figures are from the 
just-published Almanac of American Politics 2008.)
Typical of Democrats trying to hold on to seats won 
in 2006 is Representative Heath Shuler, who defeated 
GOP incumbent Charles Taylor in a western North 
Carolina district where Hispanics account for just 
2.6 percent of the population. It is no accident that 
Shuler has featured his sponsorship of the Secure 
America through Verification and Enforcement Act 
on his congressional website. The proposal, Shuler 
says, would “drastically reduce illegal immigration” 
through “a strict emphasis on border security, 
employer verification, and interior enforcement.”4  
No one will accuse Shuler of being “soft” on 
immigration. And his stance has made Shuler 
a regular on Dobbs’ program.
The evidence from both the 2008 Republican 
primaries and public opinion polls points to a 
decline in the saliency of the immigration issue 
and a slight decline of restrictionist sentiment. 
Nonetheless, the figures on swing districts in the 
House suggest the limits of extrapolating national 
trends to the behavior of individual members of 
Congress. To offer a more modest version of Tip 
O’Neill’s famous axiom: Politics, including 
immigration politics, is often local. And because 
most representatives of swing districts cannot 
count on a large Latino vote, they are more likely 
to be influenced by voters who are themselves 
influenced by restrictionist media—particularly, in 
the case of Democrats, by Lou Dobbs. As a 
practical matter, this also suggests the limits of a 
strategy for immigration reform that counts on a 
large Latino electoral mobilization. While such a 
mobilization is desirable in and of itself as a 
democratizing step and could have an important 
effect on the presidential election, it would likely 
have a limited impact on congressional outcomes 
and congressional votes.
IMMIgRaTION aTTITuDES:  
aN OvERvIEw
President Bush has declared that the United States 
is a “nation that values immigration.”5  Indeed, 
immigration is embedded in our country’s history. 
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that the vast 
majority of the public has a positive view of 
immigration’s historical role. For example, a 2002 
Gallup poll found that 75 percent of Americans 
said that immigration has been “a good thing” for 
the country in the past. 
Americans also view immigration as “a good thing” 
for the country today. From 2001 to 2007, a 
majority of the public has shared this viewpoint. 
But there was a modest decline between 2006 to 
2007, reflecting the broader trends mentioned 
earlier. In 2007, the year of the immigration debate 
in Congress, 60 percent reported immigration is “a 
good thing,” including 59 percent of non-Hispanic 
whites, 55 percent of blacks, and 74 percent of 
Hispanics. Immigration opponents clearly had an 
impact on public opinion in the critical year.
As Gallup noted, while most Americans tend to 
assess the concept of immigration positively, the 
majority of the public does not want to increase 
immigration.6 A June 2007 Gallup poll found  
that 45 percent of the public favors decreasing 
  A REPORT ON ThE MEDIA AND ThE IMMIgRATION DEbATE 75
immigration6 levels, while 35 percent said it should 
remain at its current level. Only 16 percent wanted 
immigration levels increased. The percentage of 
Americans supporting a decrease in immigration 
varied sharply by subgroup. While close to half  
(48 percent) of non-Hispanic whites and 46 
percent of blacks said that immigration levels 
should be decreased, only 30 percent of Hispanics 
shared that view. It is striking that over the last 
several years and across many measures, African-
Americans and non-Hispanic whites have held 
similar views on immigration. African-Americans 
are often regarded as natural allies of liberal 
causes, but there was considerable opposition on 
black talk radio to a path to citizenship. African-
American commentators pointed to high rates of 
black unemployment in expressing distress and 
anger over the phrase, commonly used by immi-
gration reformers, that immigrants took jobs that 
“Americans won’t do.”7 
The share of Americans favoring a decrease in the 
immigration level is currently lower than it was in 
the mid-1990s when 65 percent favored decreasing 
immigration levels. Economic distress in the early 
1990s certainly played a role in the shift toward a 
restrictionist view. 
When asked in a 2007 Gallup poll if immigrants 
make the “economy in general” worse, close to half 
of Americans (46 percent) said they did. A slight 
majority of blacks (52 percent) and close to half 
of whites (49 percent) saw immigrants as making 
the economy “worse.” For Hispanics, the figure 
was 25 percent.  
Indeed, there was a striking correlation between the 
monthly seasonally adjusted unemployment rate—as 
reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from the 
Current Population Survey—and attitudes toward 
immigration, as reported on Chart Five. 
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As the unemployment rate rises, so does support 
for decreasing immigration. A June 2007 Gallup 
poll reported that about one-third of Americans 
(34 percent) said immigrants to the U.S. were making 
job opportunities “worse” for the respondent’s 
family. On the other hand a 2006 Gallup poll found 
that nearly three-quarters of Americans said illegal 
immigrants took low-paying jobs that Americans 
did not want. Only 17 percent of Americans said 
illegal immigrants took jobs that Americans 
wanted, though that figure was 24 percent among 
African-Americans. 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, clearly 
had a separate impact8. According to a Gallup poll, 
41 percent of Americans preferred a decrease in 
immigration in June 2001. That figure jumped to 
58 percent in October 2001 following the attacks. 
Although views on immigration today remain 
rather negative, as 45 percent of Americans want 
to decrease immigration levels, Americans appear 
to have a more positive attitude toward immigration 
now than they did in the mid-1990s and in the 
period immediately after 9/11.    
A 2006 Gallup poll reported that one in five 
Americans (20 percent) said “too many” immigrants 
from European countries were entering the U.S., 
and a comparable share said that too many were 
entering from African countries. More (31 percent) 
said that too many immigrants were coming to the 
U.S. from Asian countries. Thirty-nine percent said 
that too many immigrants were entering the U.S. 
from Arab countries. By far the strongest opposition 
was to immigration from Latin American countries: 
48 percent of Americans said that too many 
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immigrants were arriving from those nations. 
Clearly, reaction to immigration is not simply a 
generalized phenomenon. There is greater opposition 
to Latin and Arab immigration than to immigration 
by other groups. Opposition to Arab immigration 
is no doubt a product of the post-9/11 reaction 
that produced a spike in negative feelings toward 
immigration generally. The reaction to Latinos 
suggests a cultural and perhaps also a racial response, 
but it may primarily be a response to the fact that 
Latinos make up such a significant and visible 
proportion of recent immigrants.
According to a 2007 Gallup poll, the majority of 
Americans (58 percent), including a majority of 
blacks (52 percent) and whites (63 percent), said 
immigrants to the United States were making the 
crime situation in the country “worse.” Strikingly, 
41 percent of Hispanics also said immigrants were 
worsening the crime situation. 
Additionally, majorities said that immigrants were 
negatively affecting taxes. In response to a 2007 
Gallup question about whether immigrants were 
making taxes in the country “better or worse, or not 
having much effect,” more than half of Americans 
(55 percent) said immigrants were making taxes 
“worse.” Only 11 percent said they were making 
taxes “better.” Views regarding the effect of immi-
grants on taxes varied by race. Close to 60 percent 
of whites and 54 percent of blacks said immigrants 
were making taxes worse; only 34 percent of 
Hispanics felt that way. 
Gallup regularly asks an open-ended question about 
“the most important problem facing this country 
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today.” As Chart Six shows, immigration has only 
rarely emerged out of the single digits. In May 2008, 
only 4 percent labeled immigration as the most 
important problem confronting the U.S., but there 
have been spikes in concern. From March to April 
2006, the proportion of Americans identifying 
immigration as the nation’s most important problem 
jumped from 6 to 19 percent. The increase appears 
to be a response to legislation, known as the Sensen-
brenner bill, named for its primary sponsor, Repre-
sentative F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., a Wisconsin 
Republican, that would make undocumented 
presence in the U.S. a felony. The bill was passed in 
the House in December 2005, and sparked protests 
in cities across the country. In May 2006, the share 
of Americans identifying immigration as the nation’s 
most important problem dropped to 13 percent; in 
June, it grew to 18 percent. Concern fell back to a 
range of 5 to 10 percent until April 2007, when it 
began rising again, hitting 15 percent in June.That 
spike coincided with the Senate’s consideration of 
the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007.
aMERICa’S TORN MIND  
ON IMMIgRaTION
The way the immigration issue is framed, both by 
the media and by activists in the battle for new 
legislation, is especially important because 
Americans are deeply torn in their attitudes about 
immigrants and immigration. As we saw earlier, 
Americans are philosophically pro-immigration 
but operationally in favor of a variety of restrictions. 
Majorities are pragmatic about the need to find 
solutions to the immigration problem that do not 
involve wholesale deportations. Yet they see illegal 
immigration as an injustice. They do not want 
As we saw earlier, Americans are philosophically 
pro-immigration but operationally in favor of a 
variety of restrictions.
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immigrants to lack basic social services (notably 
education and health care), yet they are unhappy 
offering too many public services to immigrants 
and worry about the impact of doing so on taxes. 
At bottom, Americans are deeply practical in their 
view of immigration. They understand how difficult 
the problem is to solve. They see mass deportations 
as posing economic and logistical difficulties, and 
moral difficulties, too. That is why many polls have 
found majorities in favor of a path to citizenship. 
Yet majorities are also bothered that so many 
immigrants are here illegally. In areas of rapid recent 
immigration, taxpayers worry about the impact of 
immigrants on services, and some citizens worry 
about sudden changes in the character of their 
communities. That is why surveys can sometimes 
also find majorities in favor of requiring all illegal 
immigrants to leave. And the attitudes of respon-
dents toward individual immigrants are often 
more positive than their view of immigrants as a 
group. Indeed, the citizens of areas with high levels 
of immigration often have a more positive view of 
individual immigrants than do residents of areas 
where few immigrants have come, simply because 
residents in high-concentration localities have  
had positive contacts with hardworking new 
arrivals to the country. 
The upshot is that three broad camps of opinion 
emerge on the immigration question. Roughly 
speaking, a third of the country is broadly pro-
immigration; a third is strongly inclined to favor 
restrictionist measures; and the middle third is 
ambivalent. Members of this middle third admire 
our long immigration tradition and believe that 
the newest arrivals make a significant contribution 
to the country, but they worry about the economic 
and social impact of illegal immigration and the 
government’s apparent inability to “control the 
borders.” This middle group is especially influenced 
by how the immigration issue is framed.
In recent years, two major studies were especially 
successful in capturing the complexity of American 
opinion on immigration. In March 2006, the Pew 
Research Center and the Pew Hispanic Center 
released their seminal report, “America’s Immigra-
tion Quandary.” And in December 2007, Democ-
racy Corps released “Winning the Immigration 
Issue,” a paper addressed to Democratic candidates 
and officeholders based on a highly detailed study 
of many dimensions of the immigration question.
Some of the Democracy Corps’ key findings are 
summarized in Tables Five and Six, and they offer 
a portrait of ambivalence and uncertainty. The survey 
of likely voters found a narrow majority (52 percent) 
responding favorably to the idea of deporting all 
illegal immigrants even as strong majorities also 
supported implementing a guest worker program 
(76 percent) and allowing illegal immigrants who 
pay a fine and learn English to be eligible to apply 
for citizenship (64 percent). Those surveyed 
overwhelmingly favored allowing illegal immigrants 
to use hospitals and emergency rooms (64 percent) 
but overwhelmingly opposed giving them coverage 
under Medicaid (only 25 percent favored this). 
There was great sympathy (74 percent) for allowing 
the children of illegal immigrants to attend public 
schools in grades kindergarten through 12, but there 
was strong opposition to granting the children of 
illegal immigrants in-state tuition rates at public 
colleges (only 35 percent in favor).
The 2006 Pew study found similar ambivalences. 
A strong majority (67 percent) opposed making 
illegal immigrants eligible for social services at the 
state and local level. But close to three-quarters (71 
percent) said that the children of illegal immigrants 
should be allowed to attend public schools. Like 
other surveys, it pointed to a country divided 
roughly into thirds on the immigration question.
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approve disapprove 
Deport all illegal immigrants 52 45
Implement a gust worker program to allow immigrants to work in the  
U.S. for a set period of time 
76 21
Allow illegal immigrants who pay a fine and learn English to be eligible  
to apply for citizenship
64 34
Cut off non-essential public services, such as welfare programs,  
to illegal immigrants
65 33
Double the number of border patrol agents 77 21
Tougher enforcement so businesses don't hire illegal workers 80 18
build a fence along the U.S.-Mexico border 51 46
approve disapprove 
Public schools from kindergarten through high school for the children  
of illegal immigrants who are American Citizens
74 24
Public schools from kindergarten through high school for children who  
are here illegally 
50 49
Entrance to state colleges at in-state tuition rates for children of illegal 
immigrants
35 62
Use of hospitals and emergency rooms 64 33
Medicaid 25 73
Driver’s licenses 31 68
Source: greenberg Quinlan Rosner for Democracy Corps. Nov. 29 – Dec. 3, 2007 survey of likely voters.
Source: greenberg Quinlan Rosner for Democracy Corps. Nov. 29 – Dec. 3, 2007 survey of likely voters.
wORDINg Of quESTION: “ Now let me read you some immigration policies. For each one, please tell me whether you 
favor or oppose that measure.”
wORDINg Of quESTION: “ I am going to read you a list of public services. After I read each one, I would like you to tell 
me whether you approve or disapprove of illegal immigrants receiving that service.”
TablE fIvE   
TablE SIx   
  aMERICaNS’ aMbIvalENCE TOwaRD IMMIgRaTION
  aMERICaNS’ aTTITuDE TOwaRD PublIC SERvICES fOR IllEgal IMMIgRaNTS
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When offered a choice between requiring illegal 
immigrants to go home or granting them permanent 
legal status, 53 percent of Americans in the Pew 
study favored deportation and 40 percent opted 
for allowing them to stay. But when an additional 
option was introduced—allowing immigrant 
workers to stay temporarily—opinion splinted 
further. Pew found that 32 percent of Americans 
favored allowing immigrants to gain permanent 
legal status, 32 percent favored the temporary 
worker option and 27 percent favored deportation. 
A significant plurality (46 percent) of conservative 
Republicans favored a temporary worker program, 
while a large plurality of liberal Democrats (49 
percent) favored a path to permanent legal status.
The Pew study is so rich in detail that it cannot 
be fully summarized here. However, it is worth 
focusing briefly on the survey’s important findings 
that underscore how differently the immigration 
issue was viewed in different parts of the country, 
and also in different localities.
Among Americans living in areas with a high 
percentage of foreign born, 33 percent considered 
immigration as a very big problem in the commu-
nity, while only 10 percent of those living in areas 
with low concentrations of immigrants shared that 
view. This finding is not surprising. Yet respondents 
living in areas with high concentrations of 
immigrants also tended to assess immigrants more 
positively than did people living in areas with a 
smaller foreign-born population. While 60 percent 
of Americans living in areas with low proportions 
of immigrants saw newcomers as threatening to 
traditional American customs and values, only 47 
percent of those in areas with high concentrations 
of immigrants held that view. And while 65 percent 
of residents in areas of low concentration saw 
immigrants as a burden because of a perception 
that they took away jobs, housing and health care 
of the native born, only 47 percent of those in areas 
of high immigrant concentration felt that way. One 
of the many paradoxes of the immigration debate 
unearthed by the Pew study is that Americans who 
live in areas of low concentrations of immigrants were 
more likely to favor a reduction in immigration— 
52 percent said this—than those who live in areas 
of high concentrations, where only 37 percent took 
this view. This seeming contradiction is explained 
in part by the fact that those who live in high 
immigrant areas were more likely to see immigrants 
as contributors to their local economy.
The Pew study also showed how attitudes toward 
immigration differed even among cities and regions 
that have high levels of immigration. Residents of 
cities on the Eastern Seaboard and in the Midwest 
with long-established immigrant populations tended 
to be less concerned about immigration than 
residents of cities in the Southwest and, to a certain 
extent, the South. In Phoenix—often seen as the 
gateway for the new wave of Hispanic immigration— 
78 percent of those surveyed identified immigration 
as a “moderately big” to “very big” problem. In Las 
Vegas, a similarly high-density, new immigrant 
city, 64 percent identified immigration that way. By 
contrast, in areas with long-established immigrant 
populations, the comparable figure for Chicago 
was 35 percent; for Washington, D.C., it was 44 
percent; and for Raleigh, N.C., it was 56 percent.
Cities that experienced high levels of immigration 
in the past appear not to view immigration with as 
much hostility as do the cities in the Southwest that 
are undergoing a more recent immigration boom. 
Residents of the southwestern cities were also 
somewhat more likely than residents of the other 
cities to see immigration as a “burden” in connection 
with social problems such as crime and welfare 
dependency. Nearly half of the respondents in 
Phoenix (46 percent) and Las Vegas (45 percent) 
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said that Hispanic immigrants significantly 
increased crime. In Chicago, Raleigh and Wash-
ington, the comparable figures, respectively, were 
30 percent, 37 percent and 31 percent. Residents of 
Phoenix and Las Vegas were more likely than 
residents of the other cities to say that Hispanic 
immigrants often ended up on welfare.
The Pew authors nicely summarized the complexity 
of public opinion:
 Most Americans express some concern about the 
growing immigrant population in one way or 
another, but the nature of those concerns vary and 
are expressed with varying intensity by different 
segments of the population. Competition for jobs, 
the erosion of traditional American values, the costs 
to local government and the threats of terrorism 
and crime are all sources of immigration-related 
concern to some Americans, but none of these is a 
dominant or primary cause of worry. And on 
virtually every one of these points, a substantial 
share of the population takes a positive view of 
immigrants or finds no cause for concern. 
Two years later, that is a fair reading of a country 
that is ambivalent, divided and, in some ways, 
indifferent to the issues surrounding immigration.
CONCluSION: THE MEDIa’S POwER  
IN aN aMbIvalENT ENvIRONMENT
The profound ambivalence of Americans about so 
many aspects of the immigration question suggests 
that the politics of this issue will remain complicated 
for a long time to come. There are different 
majorities on different aspects of the issue, but no 
single majority overall. These multiple majorities 
make compromise especially difficult. Concessions 
designed to win over one key constituency can easily 
turn off another. For example, temporary worker 
programs can attract conservative Republicans 
who might otherwise support more restrictionist 
measures. But such programs are especially 
unpopular among liberal Democrats who form one 
of the core support groups for a comprehensive 
solution that would allow illegal immigrants to stay. 
There are many other examples of how compromise 
proposals can easily misfire politically. 
Because immigration is usually of concern to only 
a small minority of Americans, mobilized groups 
on either side of the issue can disproportionately 
influence the outcome of any given skirmish. And 
because middle ground opinion is so torn between 
its search for practical solutions and its sense of 
aggrievement over the presence of illegal immigrants, 
its views can easily be shaped by how the issue is 
framed and which aspects of the problem are 
accentuated.
If anything, in recent years the politics of the issue 
have become more, rather than less, complicated. 
In the past, the immigration issue had little partisan 
or ideological salience. Conservatives and liberals, 
Republicans and Democrats were about equally 
divided. That made for complicated alliances, but 
it also facilitated cross-party compromises such as 
the Simpson-Mazzoli Act of 1986. Today, as the 
issue is drawn more into ideological politics and 
particularly as conservative Republicans move 
toward more restrictionist positions, the older style 
of compromise politics may become obsolete. And 
outside the Latino community, there is considerable 
evidence that the most intense feeling about 
immigration is held, for the moment at least, on 
the conservative side.
In this environment, the media have a larger 
impact than usual. As Roberto Suro’s paper shows, 
the immigration reform bill of 2007 foundered for 
a broad range of reasons. The media effect was just 
one factor. But the current media environment 
  A REPORT ON ThE MEDIA AND ThE IMMIgRATION DEbATE 83
may have been especially hostile to reform 
efforts. Talk radio accelerated the movement of 
Republicans away from compromise. Lou Dobbs’ 
efforts raised the price of compromise for Democrats. 
And taken together, talk radio and Dobbs were by 
far the most energetic and opinionated voices in 
the immigration debate. The traditional media 
lacked the interest in the issue shown by passionate 
media opponents of immigration reform, and the 
more liberal media were far less engaged in the 
issue than their conservative counterparts. There 
is some evidence that African-American talk 
radio was ambivalent about reform, and some 
important black hosts voiced skepticism about 
proposals for legalization. The Latino media were 
certainly forceful, engaged and effective with their 
own constituency.9 But ambivalence about 
compromise proposals blunted their impact. 
And, in any event, the ability of Latino media to 
influence the swing votes in Congress among 
Anglos—conservative Republicans and moderate 
Democrats—was limited. With the country 
divided and ambivalent about immigration 
reform, the current balance of forces in the media 
is more likely to contribute to the Triumph of No 
than to blaze a path to Yes.
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